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Chapter 1: The Complexity of First-Order Theories
Given a first-order theory T , how can we measure its complexity? We would like
such a measure to be representative of some important features of the theory and
to take on enough different values to distinguish between many different theories.
A classical answer to this question is to consider the spectrum function of T
– the function taking uncountable cardinals λ to the number I(T, λ) of pairwise
non-isomorphic models of T . By important work of Shelah, Hart, Hrushovski, and
Laskowski (see [27] and [3] for example), we know that these spectrum functions are
always comparable (indeed there is essentially a list of them), and that they represent
important properties of the theory, such as stability, superstability, NDOP, depth,
and so on. Thus this is an excellent indicator of complexity; if T1 has fewer models
than T2 (eventually) then T1 is “less complex” than T2, and so on.
However, this completely ignores the situation for countable model theory.
For example, the theory of dense linear orders (without endpoints) has only one
countable model, yet is “maximally complex” with regard to the spectrum function
above. This sort of behavior is extremely common – one can be quite complicated
at the countable level, but be quite simple at the uncountable level, or vice-versa.
One fix seems to be to consider simply the number of countable models, but this
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turns out to be quite a coarse invariant (regardless of how Vaught’s conjecture turns
out), and we can do better.
One better way turns out to be Borel reducibility. We begin this chapter
by defining Borel reductions. We will then build up the general theory around
these, including basic results and several benchmarks. Additionally, we discuss back-
and-forth equivalence, potential cardinality, and the connection this gives between
countable model theory and uncountable model theory.
We hope to justify our assertion that (among other things) ℵ0-categorical
theories are “minimally complex,” despite the possibility that they could be quite
complex in terms of classical stability theory.
1.1 Borel Reductions
We are interested in measuring the complexity of the isomorphism problem for
countable models of T , which is a finer measurement than just counting the number
of countable models. A common way to do this is through the idea of Borel re-
ducibility – establishing a natural way to see if one relation is “more difficult” than
another to compute. That is: given two sentences Φ and Ψ, we say that “Φ is at
least as complex as Ψ” if (Mod(Ψ, ω),∼=) ≤B (Mod(Φ, ω),∼=). We will now define
these terms.
The notion of a Borel reduction as a way to compare complexity of classes was
introduced by Friedman and Stanley in [4]. Consider pairs of the form (X,E), where
X is a Borel subset of a Polish space, and E ⊆ X2 is an equivalence relation. Given
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two such pairs, we say (X1, E1) ≤B (X2, E2) (sometimes written as E1 ≤B E2) if
there is a Borel function f : X1 → X2 where, for all a, b ∈ X, aE1b holds if and
only if f(a)E2f(b). It is clear that ≤B forms a preorder, and the requirement that
f be Borel provides a reasonable analogue to saying “E1 is effectively computable
from E2” when (as is usual) X1 and X2 are uncountable. We will use <B when the
relation is strict – that is, (X,E) <
B
(Y, F ) precisely when (X,E) ≤
B
(Y, F ), but
(Y, F ) 6≤
B




(Y, F ) and (Y, F ) ≤
B
(X,E).
For a countable language L, define XωL (for the purpose of this section) to be
the set of L-structures with universe ω. This is a Polish space using the formula
topology: for any formula φ(x) and any tuple n from ω, the set {M ∈ XωL :M |=
φ(n)} is open. L-isomorphism is a natural equivalence relation on this space.
It is well-known that for any isomorphism-invariant Borel subset B of XωL ,
there is a corresponding Lω1,ω-sentence ΦB, such that B is the set of models of ΦB
– see, for example, Theorem 16.8 in [8]. We refer to B as Mod(ΦB, ω).
This preorder notion is well-defined and independently beautiful, but it has
a shortcoming: given a specific Φ, one might ask “how complex is Φ?” The most
precise answer to this question – it is Borel bireducible to (Mod(Φ, ω),∼=) – is less
than illuminating.
Less precisely but more usefully, we might ask how Φ compares to some specific
“test” relation, the significance of which is understood to the writer and the reader.
Toward this end, we have assembled a useful class of benchmark relations, each of
which has some independent significance.
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1.1.1 Smooth Relations
Formally, (X,E) is smooth if, for some standard Borel space Y , (X,E) ≤
B
(Y,=). It
turns out that all standard Borel spaces (such as XωL , R, or 2ω) are in Borel bijection
with one another, so the Y above can be chosen to be whatever you like (see [8]
for this and similar results). Intuitively, (X,E) is smooth if there is a “mechanical”
assignment of real invariants to the E-classes of X.
The smooth relations are linearly ordered by <
B
, and are completely classified





· · · (ω,=) <
B
(2ω,=)
It is straightforward to show that all of these reductions are strict: if (X,E) ≤
B
(Y, F ), then |X/E| ≤ |Y/F |. That these are all the possible smooth relations is a
theorem of Silver, related to the fact that the continuum hypothesis holds for analytic
sets. The point for us is that if (X,E) is smooth, then it is completely described by
the number of E-classes.
Some of the smooth classes can be seen as minimal, in the following sense:






(κ,=) if and only if Ψ has at most κ countable models, and
symmetrically with the latter.
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Note that here and throughout, we will use Φ ≤
B
Ψ as shorthand for
(Mod(Φ, ω),∼=) ≤B (Mod(Ψ, ω),∼=)
Similarly we will say “Φ is smooth” when we really mean (Mod(Φ, ω),∼=) is smooth.
The proof of this Proposition requires Scott sentences which we discuss in
detail in the next section. The reader may prefer to skip ahead to there, but only
the standard facts from any beginning model theory course are used.
Proof of Proposition 1.1.1. Let Ψ be an Lω1ω-sentence. First suppose that Ψ has
exactly κ ≤ ℵ0 countable models (up to isomorphism); let {Ψi : i ∈ κ} be the
Scott sentences of these models. We show (Mod(Ψ, ω),∼=) ≤B (κ,=). Given M ∈
Mod(Ψ, ω), say f(M) = i if and only if M |= Ψi. This is a well-defined bijection.
Additionally, if M,N ∈ Mod(Ψ, ω), then M ∼= N if and only if their Scott sentences
are equal, if and only if f(M) = f(N). Finally, this is a Borel reduction: (κ,=) has
the discrete topology, so it’s enough to show that f−1(i) is Borel for each i. This is
true, since f−1(i) = Mod(Ψi, ω), which is Borel by a standard argument. So f is a
Borel reduction.
On the other hand, suppose Ψ has at least κ models; let {Mi : i ∈ κ} be
pairwise nonisomorphic elements of Mod(Ψ). Define f : κ → Mod(Ψ, ω) where
f(i) = Mi. This is an injection, meaning i = j if and only if f(i) = f(j). Since κ
has the discrete topology, f is continuous and thus Borel, completing the proof.
It is noteworthy that we did not say “if Φ is smooth and Ψ has at least as
many countable models as Φ, then Φ ≤
B
Ψ;” that is, the smooth relations are not
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necessarily minimal in this sense. The only exception is (2ω,=), the minimality of
which would imply Vaught’s conjecture (among other things).
1.1.2 Borel Relations
Suppose (X,E) is some equivalence relation, and X is a standard Borel space. We
say E is Borel if it is a Borel subset of X ×X. As usual, say Φ is Borel if the graph
of the isomorphism relation is Borel as a subset of Mod(Φ, ω)2. In particular, we
say that E is Π0α if it a Π
0
α subset of X×X, and say Φ is Π0α likewise. The following
theorem motivates the definition:
Theorem 1.1.2. Let Φ be an Lω1ω-sentence. The following are equivalent:
• Φ is Borel.
• There is a countable ordinal β where for all M,N ∈ Mod(Φ, ω), M ∼= N if
and only if M ≡β N .1
This result is folklore with no clear origin point, but a proof appears in [2].
As might be expected, if Φ is Π0α, there is a β which is a linear polynomial in α
(with coefficients in ω1) such that ≡β is sufficient for isomorphism among countable
models of Φ. Likewise, given such a β, one can similarly compute an α from β where
Φ is Π0α. The exact computations are inexact (that is, they provide non-sharp upper
bounds) and depend on one’s specific formulation of back-and-forth equivalence, so
we will not describe them here.
1The relation ≡β is defined by the usual back-and-forth game of ordinal length. See for instance
[13] or [5].
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One could conclude from the above theorem that there is “no hope” of “un-
derstanding” the isomorphism relation for Φ if Φ is not Borel; certainly there is not
a bounded computation which can determine isomorphism. However, understand-
ing an equivalence relation often involves assigning invariants to the classes, and
that ship sailed when we left smooth, so discarding the non-Borel relations may be
premature.
The Borel relations are “simpler” than non-Borel relations in another sense:
if Φ ≤
B
Ψ and Ψ is Borel, then Φ is also Borel. It is thus easy to imagine the Borel
relations as minimal, but this is incorrect (for some notions of minimal):
Theorem 1.1.3 (Friedman, Stanley). There are Lω1ω-sentences Φ and Ψ where Φ
is Borel, Ψ is not Borel, and Φ 6≤
B
Ψ (indeed they are incomparable).
We will give several such examples later.
It turns out that the smooth relations really are minimal among the Borel
relations: if Φ is smooth, then Φ is Borel. Additionally, if Ψ is Borel but not
smooth, then Φ <
B
Ψ.
Unlike the smooth relations, there is no nice characterization of the Borel
relations – even those of the form (Mod(Φ, ω),∼=). Despite this, it is a theorem of
Hjorth, Kechris, and Louveau that the Borel equivalence relations are stratified into
ω1 distinct classes, each of which has a maximal element and which corresponds to
being “potentially Π0α” in a particular sense. We describe this result now.
We define ∼=0 as (ω,=), which can be seen as the isomorphism relation of some
complete first-order theory T0 in a relational language L0.
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Given ∼=α as the isomorphism relation of some theory Tα in a relational lan-
guage Lα, we define Lα+1 = {Eα} ∪ Lα, where Eα is some binary relation not
appearing in Lα. Then Tα+1 states that Eα is an equivalence relation with infinitely
many classes, each of which is a model of Tα, and the models do not interact (say,
the relations in Lα are always false on mixed tuples). The resulting theory Tα+1 is
complete by a standard argument.
Finally for limit λ, given ∼=α, Tα, and Lα for all α < λ, let Lλ be {Uα : α < λ}
along with the disjoint union of the Lα. Let Tλ state that the unary predicates Uα
are disjoint, and the set of realizations of Uα form a model of Tα. Additionally, if
R ∈ Lα and a is a tuple which contains some element not of Uα, then R(a) is taken
to be false. The resulting theory Tλ is complete; the “unsorted elements” which
exist by compactness are unstructured and turn out not to matter.
The reader is encouraged to check that these ∼=α are Borel bi-reducible to the
=α described in [7]. Intuitively, we should think of Tα+1 as coding sets of models of
Tα, while T0 codes natural numbers. Thus Tα codes hereditarily countable sets of
rank α, where we consider the natural numbers as urelements.
Theorem 1.1.4 (Hjorth, Kechris, Louveau). Let α be a countable ordinal. Then
there is a countable ordinal β such that:
For all Lω1ω-sentences Φ, Φ ≤B∼=α if and only if Φ is “potentially Π0β:” for
some equivalent topology2 τ on Mod(Φ, ω), the graph of isomorphism for Φ is a Π0β
subset of τ × τ .
2That is, yielding the same Borel sets
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For example, one can easily see that if we add relations for countably many
(infinitary) formulas, we gain a refined topology on Mod(Φ, ω) which is equivalent
to the original, although not all equivalent topologies are so easily described. Thus
the idea of being potentially Π0β is a sort of “language-free” measure of complexity
of the sentence.
Therefore the relations∼=α are of independent interest. The following extension
explains why they are useful for us:
Theorem 1.1.5. For all α < β, ∼=α<B∼=β.
If Φ is Borel, then Φ ≤
B
∼=α for some α.
The second clause of Theorem 1.1.5 follows from Theorem 1.1.4, but the first
(showing the strictness of the embedding) needs an additional argument. A highly
technical argument appears in [4] which relies on Borel determinacy; a much sim-
pler argument appears in [28] which uses potential cardinality, and is sketched in
Proposition 1.2.16 later in this chapter.
Thus the ∼=α form a strictly increasing sequence which is cofinal in the Borel
sentences. Thus we can measure the complexity of a sentence Φ with some precision
by proving results of the form ∼=α≤B Φ <B∼=α+1. Indeed, even if Φ is not Borel, it
makes sense to find the minimal α where ∼=α 6≤B Φ, and this is a good measure of
complexity of Φ.
The first three of the ∼=α will be of particular interest to us. ∼=0 and ∼=1 are
smooth: ∼=0 is (ω,=), and ∼=1 is (R,=). Less trivially, we have the following theorem
of Marker from [14]:
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Theorem 1.1.6 (Marker). Let T be a complete first-order theory which is non-small
– that is, where S(T ) is uncountable. Then ∼=2≤B T .
That is, ∼=2 is the minimal element among isomorphism relations for non-
small theories. Thus, if T is non-small and T ∼
B
∼=2, then T is ≤B -minimal among
all non-small theories.
This concludes our survey of the Borel equivalence relations.
1.1.3 Borel Complete Relations
We have now discussed various notions of “minimal” isomorphism relations; from
ℵ0-categorical theories which are actually minimal, to various objects which are
minimal among those which satisfy certain constraints. There is also a maximal
relation.
Say Φ is Borel complete if, for all Ψ, Ψ ≤
B
Φ. The word is due to Friedman
and Stanley in [4], and is somewhat unfortunate. It means “complete with regard
to Borel reductions” and not “complete among Borel relations” or “maximal among
Borel relations.” In fact:
Theorem 1.1.7 (Friedman, Stanley). If Φ is Borel complete, then Φ is not Borel;
in fact its isomorphism relation is complete analytic.
It is easy to see that if such a relation were Borel, of some height Π0α, then
every Ψ would be potentially Π0α as well by Theorem 1.1.5, collapsing the hierarchy
(which doesn’t happen; see [7] or [5]). The result stated above is somewhat stronger,
although it should be noted that the converse does not hold (also proven in that
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paper).
The really surprising thing about Borel complete relations is that they exist.
Indeed, they are common:
Theorem 1.1.8 (Friedman, Stanley). The following classes are all Borel complete:
graphs, trees, groups, fields, linear orders, . . . .
Indeed many of these results can be sharpened, in the sense that much smaller
subclasses can be shown to be Borel complete (which implies Borel completeness of
the larger class). For example, the class of discrete linear orders without endpoints
is Borel complete (see Chapter 2). For any prime p, the class of nilpotent class 2
groups with exponent p are Borel complete [4]. The class of fields of characteristic
p is Borel complete, for any prime p [4]. The class of real-closed fields is Borel
complete [25]. Many other results along these lines have been proven as well.
It seems that any reasonably expressive class without a “depth limit” is Borel
complete. In a way it is almost more surprising that a natural class along these lines
would not be Borel complete, but this can happen:
Theorem 1.1.9 (Friedman, Stanley). The class of abelian groups is neither Borel
nor Borel complete.
Indeed, for any prime p, the class of abelian p-groups is neither Borel nor
Borel complete. Indeed, ∼=2 is not Borel reducible to any of these classes. Despite
this, the graph of isomorphism for this class is complete analytic.
This example is not first-order, but in [28], we demonstrated several complete
first-order theories with similar behavior.
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1.2 Back-and-Forth Equivalence
Let us now consider the question of back-and-forth equivalence. Given two L-
structures A and B, we say a set F is a back-and-forth system from A to B if
all the following are satisfied:
1. The elements of F are partial functions from A to B.
2. If f ∈ F , a ⊂ dom(f), and R ∈ L, then A |= R(a) if and only if B |= R(fa).
3. If f ∈ F and a ∈ A, there is g ∈ F where f ⊂ g and a ∈ dom(g)
4. If f ∈ F and b ∈ B, there is g ∈ F where f ⊂ g and b ∈ im(g).
We say A and B are back-and-forth equivalent, denoted A ≡∞ω B, if there is a
back-and-forth system from A to B. It is immediate that if A ∼= B, then A ≡∞ω B –
if f : A→ B is an isomorphism, then {f} is a back-and-forth system. Despite this,
we often think of F as consisting of finite partial functions. With this restriction,
we could instead let F be the set of finite sub-functions of f .
The converse holds when A and B are countable; this is the origin of the “back
and forth argument” and the proof is immediate:
Proposition 1.2.1. Suppose A ≡∞ω B. If A and B are countable, then A ∼= B.
The property “F is a back-and-forth system from A to B” is absolute between
transitive models of ZFC; the following is an immediate consequence:
Corollary 1.2.2. Regardless of the cardinalities of A and B, if A ≡∞ω B, then
A ∼= B in any forcing extension V[G] in which both A and B are countable.
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In fact, the converse is true, although we will save the proof for the next section.
Thus, if A ≡∞ω B, then A and B are “potentially isomorphic.” Consequently, they
are “indistinguishable” from the point of view of certain logics:
Corollary 1.2.3. Suppose A ≡∞ω B. If φ ∈ L∞ω is any infinitary sentence, then
A |= φ if and only if B |= φ.
The proof of this fact follows from an observation, immediate by standard
absoluteness results, that for any structure M and any φ ∈ L∞ω, the expression
“M |= φ” is absolute.
With this in mind, one could reasonably ask the following question. Suppose
A and B are structures which are non-isomorphic, but nevertheless they are back-
and-forth equivalent. In what sense are they distinguishable?
It is our opinion that in many interesting ways, they are not distinguishable, as
evidenced by Corollary 1.2.3. Thus, we consider the following a meaningful invariant
of a theory T :
Definition 1.2.4. Let T be a first-order theory (or more generally, a sentence of
Lω1ω). Let I∞ω(T ) be the number of back-and-forth inequivalent models of T , of
any cardinality; let I∞ω(T ) =∞ if there are class-many such.
It is more interesting to give a few examples:
Example 1.2.5. Suppose T is ℵ0-categorical. Then I∞ω(T ) = 1.
Proof. Let A and B be models of T . Let V[G] be a forcing extension in which A
and B are both countable. Being ℵ0-categorical is absolute, so A ∼= B in the forcing
extension. Thus A ≡∞ω B in the ground model V, witnessing I∞ω(T ) = 1.
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Example 1.2.6. Let T be the theory of algebraically closed fields of characteristic
p (p prime or zero). Then I∞ω(T ) = ℵ0. The models are given by the transcendence
degree, where the options are n, for any n ∈ ω, or “infinite.”
Proof. If two countable models are back-and-forth equivalent, they are isomorphic;
thus the usual models of finite transcendence degree are all back-and-forth inequiv-
alent, and inequivalent to the (countable) model with infinite transcendence degree.
But now let A and B be models with infinite transcendence degree. Let V[G]
be a forcing extension in which both are countable. Then it is easy to see they still
have infinite transcendence degree in the forcing extension, but are countable, so
isomorphic. Hence they are back-and-forth equivalent in V, as desired.
Before developing this theory further, we need to introduce Scott sentences.
1.2.1 Scott Sentences
The concept of a Scott sentence is standard, but we will be doing some nonstan-
dard things with it, so we review. First, to clear up any misconceptions, we define
canonical Scott sentences for all infinite L-structures, regardless of cardinality. The
definition below is in both Barwise [1] and Marker [13].
Definition 1.2.7. Suppose L is countable and M is an L-structure of cardinality κ.
For each α < κ+, define an Lκ+,ω formula φ
a
α(x) for each finite a ∈M<ω as follows:
• φa0(x) :=
∧
{θ(x) : θ atomic or negated atomic and M |= θ(a)};
• φaα+1(x) := φaα(x) ∧
∧{








• For α a non-zero limit, φaα(x) :=
∧{
φaβ(x) : β < α
}
.
Next, let α∗(M) < κ+ be least such that for all finite a, a′ from M ,
∀x[φaα∗(M)(x)↔ φa
′
α∗(M)(x)] =⇒ ∀x[φaα∗(M)+1(x)↔ φa
′
α∗(M)+1(x)]
Finally, put css(M) := φ∅α∗(M) ∧
∧{
∀x[φaα∗(M)(x)→ φaα∗(M)+1(x)] : a ∈M<ω
}
.
It can easily be seen that css(M) ∈ L|M |+ω. Also, it turns out the choice of
css(M) is highly canonical, assuming one codes formulas properly as sets. We avoid
these details and simply assert the following:
Fact 1.2.8. Let M and N be infinite L-structures. The following are equivalent:
• M ≡∞ω N
• M |= css(N)
• N |= css(M)
• css(M) = css(N)
Of course if both M and N are countable, then all of these are equivalent
to M ∼= N as well. The proofs are standard; although the reader may only be
familiar with them in the countable case, the proofs in (e.g.) [5] apply equally well
to uncountable structures if one is willing to conclude back-and-forth equivalence
instead of isomorphism. Of particular note, to us, is the following:
Proposition 1.2.9. The function css is absolute; that is, for any φ and M , the
relation “css(M) = φ” is absolute between models of ZFC.
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These two facts are why we refer to css(M) as the “canonical” Scott sentence;
other sentences (conceivably simpler sentences) could capture M up to back-and-
forth equivalence, but we want a specific sentence with useful properties.
Fact 1.2.8 and Prop 1.2.9 together give a proof of the following:
Proposition 1.2.10. Let M and N be infinite L-structures. The following are
equivalent:
1. M ≡∞ω N ,
2. in some forcing extension V[G], M ≡∞ω N , and
3. in some forcing extension V[G], M ∼= N .
Proof. If M ≡∞ω N , then let F be a back-and-forth system. In any forcing extension
V[G], F is still a back-and-forth system, so M ≡∞ω N in V[G] as well, establishing
(1)⇒ (2).
If M ≡∞ω N in V[G], then in any forcing extension V[G][H], M ≡∞ω N still.
So let V[G][H] collapse |M | and |N | to ℵ0. Then M ∼= N in V[G][H], which is a
forcing extension of V, establishing (2)⇒ (3).
Finally, suppose M ∼= N in V[G]. Let φ = css(M) in V. Then still φ = css(M)
in V[G] and M ∼= N (hence M ≡∞ω N) in V[G], so N |= φ in V[G]. Sentence
satisfaction is absolute, so N |= φ in V. By Fact 1.2.8, N ≡∞ω M in V, establishing
(3)⇒ (1).
We believe that Proposition 1.2.10 is the real justification for studying ≡∞ω
and I∞ω(T ). If two models are back-and-forth equivalent, but not isomorphic, it is
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not because of any intrinsic difference between the two, but instead because of a
characteristic of the surrounding universe of set theory, related to the existence or
nonexistence of certain functions which could exist, but happen to not exist.
We end this section with a nice application of Scott sentences to counting
I∞ω(T ):
Proposition 1.2.11. Suppose T is a theory, or possibly a countable set of Lω1ω
sentences. Suppose λ is an infinite cardinal and T has exactly κ ≤ λ back-and-forth
inequivalent models of size at most λ.
Then I∞ω(T ) = κ.
Indeed, every model of T is back-and-forth equivalent to one of size at most λ.
Proof. Let {Mi : i ∈ κ} be an exhaustive (up to equivalence) list of models of T of
size at most λ, and let φi = css(Mi) for all i. Then suppose the result is false. That





i<κ ¬φi. Since κ ≤ λ, ψ is a Lλ+ω-sentence, so there is a
fragment F of Lλ+ω of size λ which contains it. Observe that M |= ψ. Since F has
size λ, there is an F -elementary substructure of M of size at most λ by a standard
downward Löwenheim-Skolem argument.
Let N be this structure, observing that N |= ψ. Then N |= T . Since |N | ≤ λ,




Our next background concept is the notion of potential cardinality. Unlike the
previous topics discussed here, this is fairly new – at time of writing, the definition
exists only in preprint form. The interested reader should check [28] for details; we
present a digested form of the exposition there which is useful for our work here.
By the original completeness theorem, if a first-order theory T is formally
consistent, then it has a model. We can define a proof system for sentences of L∞ω
as well. The proofs are now well-founded trees, rather than finite sequences, but the
system is otherwise predictable (see e.g. [29] for details). With this in mind, we can
say a sentence φ ∈ L∞ω is consistent if it does not prove its own negation, in this
sense. After these definitions are settled, one can show that if φ ∈ L∞ω is countable
– that is, φ ∈ Lω1ω – then consistency of φ implies the existence of a model for φ.
This is a theorem of Karp in her thesis, but for a more modern treatment, see for
example [9] or [29].
Unfortunately, this ceases to be true for uncountable sentences. For example,
let L = {<} ∪ {cn : n ∈ ω}. Let ψ be the Scott sentence of (ω1, <) (making no
mention of the cn) and let φ be ψ ∧ ∀x
∨
n x = cn. Then ψ has no countable models
(ordinals are characterized up to isomorphism by back-and-forth equivalence) but φ
has no uncountable models, so φ simply has no models.
Despite this, φ is consistent – it does not prove its own negation. More to
the point, φ potentially has a model – if V[G] collapses the ordinal we think of as
ω1, then φ has a model there, which is any expansion of (ω1, <) by an exhaustive
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countable set of constants. Indeed, those who wish to avoid mention of an infinitary
proof system could take this as the definition of consistency of an infinitary sentence,
although it robs Karp’s theorem of some of its weight.
With this in mind, we make the following definition:
Definition 1.2.12. Let φ ∈ L∞ω. We say φ is a potential Scott sentence if, in some
forcing extension V[G], there is an infinite L-structure M where css(M) = φ.
This is a well-defined notion; indeed if φ is a potential Scott sentence then
φ is a canonical Scott sentence in every forcing extension in which is it countable.
We sketch the proof: if φ is inconsistent in a forcing extension, then a proof of that
inconsistency is contained in the least admissible fragment containing φ, and thus
in any transitive model of ZFC which contains φ, including V. Therefore, if φ is
consistent in V, it remains so in any V[G] where it is countable, and then by Karp’s
theorem, it has a model there.
We can now make our final definition:
Definition 1.2.13. Let T be a theory (or Lω1ω-sentence). Let CSS(T ) denote the
set of all potential canonical Scott sentences which (formally) imply T .
If CSS(T ) is a set, let ‖T‖ = |CSS(T )|; otherwise let ‖T‖ = ∞, which we
consider strictly greater than any cardinal. Refer to ‖T‖ as the potential cardinality
of T .
The following is immediate from the definitions:
Remark 1.2.14. Let T be a theory. Let I(T,ℵ0) be the number of countable models
of T , up to isomorphism (or back-and-forth equivalence).
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Then I(T,ℵ0) ≤ I∞ω(T ) ≤ ‖T‖.
All these inequalities can be strict; in particular I∞ω(T ) can be strictly less
than ‖T‖ if there are potential Scott sentences of T which do not have models. In
any case, the real point of potential cardinality is the following, which is proved in
[28]:
Theorem 1.2.15. Let T1 and T2 be theories. If T1 ≤B T2, then ‖T1‖ ≤ ‖T2‖.
We sketch the proof; a completely rigorous treatment is in [28]. Fix a Borel
reduction f : Mod(T1) → Mod(T2) and suppose Φ ∈ CSS(T1). In any forcing
extension V[G] making Φ countable, f is still a Borel reduction from Mod(T1) to
Mod(T2), so takes (the unique countable model of) Φ to some (countable model
which has) canonical Scott sentence Ψ. Since Borel reductions are Borel, we can
apply Schoenfield absoluteness to the appropriate statement about its codes, and
discover that f always takes Φ to Ψ, in any universe extending the ground model.
By a forcing argument, one can show that Ψ is actually in V, so that this induced
function f : CSS(T1) → CSS(T2) is well-defined. It is clearly an injection, so f
witnesses ‖T1‖ ≤ ‖T2‖.
Since ≤
B
does not give rise to a linear order, there is no converse to this
theorem, even in “normal” circumstances (although it will be true for the smooth
relations). Also note that this is not true for the number of back-and-forth in-
equivalent models. Indeed there are examples of theories T1 and T2 which are Borel
equivalent and where I∞ω(T1) =∞, while I∞ω(T2) = i2.
The following fact is easily shown; see [28]:
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Proposition 1.2.16. Let α be a countable ordinal.
If α is finite, then ‖ ∼=α ‖ = iα. If α is infinite, then ‖ ∼=α ‖ = iα+1.
For conciseness, observe that this is equivalent to the expression: for all count-
able α, ‖ ∼=α ‖ = i−1+α+1. We can now prove our first significant implication show-
ing that the countable model theory of T “controls” the uncountable model theory,
in the form of I∞ω(T ):
Corollary 1.2.17. If the isomorphism relation for T is Borel, then I∞ω(T ) < iω1.
In particular, if the isomorphism relation for T is Π0α, then I∞ω(T ) ≤ i−1+α+1.
This is striking, but the only direct consequence of this we will need is the
following:
Proposition 1.2.18. Let T be a theory. If the isomorphism relation for T is smooth,
then I(T,ℵ0) = I∞ω(T ) = ‖T‖.
Proof. Since T is smooth, T ≤
B
∼=1. Since ∼=1 is the unique successor of ∼=0, this
means that either T ≤
B
∼=0 or T ∼B∼=1.
If T ≤
B
∼=0, then I(T,ℵ0) = I∞ω(T ) by 1.2.11. Additionally, T ∼B (κ,=)
where κ = I(T,ℵ0), and it is easily seen that ‖(κ,=)‖ = κ and potential cardinality
is preserved under Borel equivalence. So ‖T‖ = κ, as desired.
On the other hand, if T ∼
B
∼=1, then ‖T‖ = ‖ ∼=1 ‖ = i1. Additionally, since
∼=1≤B T , there are continuum-many countable models of T , so I(T,ℵ0) = i1. Since
i1 = I(T,ℵ0) ≤ I∞ω(T ) ≤ ‖T‖ = i1, all the inequalities are equalities, completing
the proof.
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Beyond what we will need for this thesis, the aim of potential cardinality is
to show that a particular theory is not that complex, in terms of Borel reducibility.
Assuming ‖T‖ can be shown to have some cardinality which is not ∞, then T is
not Borel complete, and assuming it is less than iω1 , many Borel relations cannot
be reduced to it. This is the engine by which one can see theories which are neither
Borel nor Borel complete; see [28] for details.
1.2.3 λ-Borel Completeness
The final topic of this chapter is the idea of λ-Borel completeness. Since we are
discussing I∞ω(T ) and the uncountable model theory of T generally, one might
wonder “how maximal” T can be. Borel completeness is the right notion for the
countable models, and in [11], Laskowski and Shelah defined a corresponding notion
for uncountable models. The idea is for the models of a theory T to have maximally
complicated ≡∞ω relation among the models of size λ, for every λ. In particular
this implies Borel completeness, I∞ω(T ) = ∞, and ‖T‖ = ∞, and simultaneously
strengthens all of them.
To make this definition, for any infinite cardinal λ and any Φ ∈ Lλ+ω, let
Modλ(Φ) be the space of L-structures with universe λ which model Φ. We make
this a topological space using atomic formulas to form a subbasis, as with Modω(Φ).
A function f : Modλ(Φ) → Modλ(Ψ) is said to be λ-Borel if the preimage of
any subbasic open set is λ-Borel, meaning it can be formed as a usual Borel set,
but with conjunctions and disjunctions of size at most λ. Because of the presence
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of parameters from λ, it can easily be seen that the λ-Borel subsets of Modλ(Φ)
are precisely (infinite) Boolean combinations of subbasic open sets, so there is no
incongruity with [11].
A λ-Borel function f : Modλ(Φ) → Modλ(Ψ) is a λ-Borel reduction when
for all M,N ∈ Modλ(Φ), M ≡∞ω N if and only if f(M) ≡∞ω f(N). We denote
the existence of such a function by saying (Modλ(Φ),≡∞ω) ≤λB (Modλ(Ψ),≡∞ω),
often shortened to Φ ≤λ
B
Ψ. We say Φ is λ-Borel complete if, for all Ψ ∈ Lλ+ω,
Ψ ≤λ
B
Φ. Observe that in the case that λ = ℵ0, we recover the original notion of
Borel reductions, Borel completeness, and so on, since back-and-forth equivalence is
the same as isomorphism for countable structures; thus examples exist in that case.
But actually such sentences exist for all λ:
Theorem 1.2.19 (Laskowski, Shelah). For any infinite cardinal λ, the class of
(downward closed) subtrees of λ<ω is λ-Borel complete.
To make this completely precise, we fix a bijection λ<ω → λ so that λ has a
tree structure on it. Then a “subtree of λ<ω” is formed by expanding this structure
by a unary predicate whose realizations are downward-closed with regard to the tree
order, and outside of which we forget the tree order, along with some standard tricks
so that the complement of the “subtree” is always infinite, and thus irrelevant to
the back-and-forth equivalence structure. In [11], Laskowski and Shelah introduce
the notion of “λ-Borel complete for all λ” as a kind of maximal level of complexity
of a theory, and using Theorem 1.2.19 as a “test class,” they also produce a large
class of examples. For our purposes we will need a different test class:
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Theorem 1.2.20. Let LO be the sentence “< is a linear order” in the language
{<}. Then LO is λ-Borel complete for all λ. In particular, for all infinite λ, there
are 2λ pairwise back-and-forth inequivalent linear orders of size λ, so I∞ω(LO) =∞.
Proof. The “in particular” is a corollary, as follows. Trivially there are at most 2λ
orders of size λ, up to back-and-forth equivalence (or isomorphism). For the other
direction, it is enough to show a finite language where there are 2λ back-and-forth
inequivalent structures of size λ in that language.
To see this, recall the classical result that distinct ordinals are back-and-forth
inequivalent. Therefore, there are at least λ+ linear orders of size λ, indexed by
the interval [λ, λ+). Then consider the language {E,<}, and the incomplete theory
which states that E is an equivalence relation and < is a linear order on each class
(but not well-defined between classes). Then for any X ⊂ [λ, λ+) of size at most λ,
let MX have E-classes indexed by X, where the class corresponding to α ∈ X has
order type (α,<). If X 6= Y then MX 6≡∞ω MY , so there are at least [λ+]≤λ = 2λ
inequivalent structures – and therefore linear orders, by the reduction – of size λ.
This holds for all λ, proving that I∞ω(LO) =∞.
The main result is an extension of Friedman and Stanley’s proof that linear
orders are Borel complete.
Let λ be any infinite cardinal. It follows from Theorem 1.2.19 that there is a
finite language L where Modλ(L) – the space of L-structures with universe λ – is
λ-Borel complete. To imitate the original proof we need a notion of a λ-dense linear
order : a structure of size λ in the language {<} ∪ {Pα : α ∈ λ} where < is a dense
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linear order without endpoints, the Pi are disjoint unary predicates, and they are
dense, codense, and exhaustive in the order.
Such a model can be constructed directly. Start with M0 = (Q, <), where
each element has color P0. Given Mn, construct Mn+1 by adding new elements of
color α between every two elements of Mn, for every α < λ. Let Mω =
⋃
nMn. It
is clear that Mω is λ-dense.
From now we follow [4] quite closely; we have imitated the notation to assist
the reader.
Next, we need to define a particular linear order I<ω as a directed union
⋃
n In.
We say I−1 is empty. For each n ∈ ω, we say In is In−1 × (−∞ _ I), where we
identify In−1 with In−1 × {−∞} inside In. For any x ∈ I<ω, define `(x) as the least
n where x ∈ In.
We give a labeling f of I<ω by λ
<ω satisfying the following conditions:
• If `(x) = n, then f(x) ∈ λn.
• If x ∈ In, then f maps {x} × I onto {f(x) _ α : α ∈ λ}.
• For any x ∈ In and any α ∈ λ, f−1({f(x) _ α : α ∈ λ} is dense in {x} × I.
We define f by induction. If `(x) = 0, f(x) is the empty sequence () ∈ λ0. If
`(x) = n+ 1, then x = (y, i) for some y ∈ In and some i ∈ I, and there is a unique
α ∈ λ where I |= Pα(i). So let f(x) = f(y) _ (α). Visibly this function has the
desired properties, using λ-density of I.
Next, for each n ∈ ω, let TYn be the set of all complete atomic L-types in
variables x1, . . . , xn; since L is finite, so is TYn. Let e(0) = 0, and for each n ∈ ω,
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let e(n+ 1) = e(n) + |TYn|. Let TY =
⋃
n TYn. We fix some bijection k : TY→ ω,
so that if p ∈ TYn, then e(n) ≤ k(p) < e(n+ 1).
We can now finally produce our λ-Borel reduction. Let A be an L-structure
with universe λ; we construct a linear order MA with universe λ in a λ-Borel way,
such that for any L-structures A and B on λ, A ≡∞ω B if and only if MA ≡∞ω MB.
We construct MA from A by expanding I<ω according to A.
So for any x ∈ I<ω with `(x) = n, there is a corresponding tuple f(x) ∈ λn,
and this tuple has an atomic type otpA(f(x)), which has a corresponding index
k(otpA(f(x))). So let Jx be the linear order Q _ 2 + k(otpA(f(x))) _ Q; this is
a dense piece, followed by a long enough finite piece not to disappear but which
uniquely captures the type of f(x), followed by a dense piece to separate this infor-
mation from others. So let MA be the sum
∑
x Jx. The map A 7→ MA can easily
be made a λ-Borel function from Modλ(L) to Modλ(LO); the detail to check is that
each Jx is countable and I<ω is a fixed set of size λ, so |
∑
x Jx| can be put into
(more or less) canonical bijection with λ.
To show it is a reduction, let V[G] be a forcing extension in which λ is countable
(e.g. a Levy collapse of λ+ to ω1 will do). Observe that A ≡∞ω B if and only if
A ∼= B in V[G], and likewise with MA and MB. So pass to V[G]. Once there,
observe that I is isomorphic to any ℵ0-dense partition of (Q, <), and A and B are
(up to isomorphism) just elements of Modω(L). Therefore, this collapses to the
exact construction showing Modω(L) ≤B Modω(LO) from [4], so A ∼= B (in V[G]) if
and only if MA ∼= MB (in V[G]). This completes the proof.
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We will use this result in the following chapters to show λ-Borel completeness
for several first-order theories.
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Chapter 2: O-Minimal Theories
In 1988, Laura Mayer proved Vaught’s Conjecture for o-minimal theories in a sur-
prising way- an o-minimal T either has finitely many countable models or continuum
many. This was accomplished through a sharp dichotomy she introduced: whether
or not T admits a “nonsimple type.” If T admits a nonsimple type, T must have
continuum-many models. If not, the isomorphism relation can be simply character-
ized, and T has continuum-many countable models if and only if there are infinitely
many nonisolated types.
In this paper we sharpen this divide, completely characterizing where∼=T lies in
the Borel complexity hierarchy. Most prominently we show that, given a nonsimple
type, T is Borel complete, and indeed λ-Borel complete for all λ. This is proved by
reducing the isomorphism problem for linear orders into the one for models of T ;
by Theorem 3 in [4] and Theorem 1.2.20, every isomorphism problem is reducible
to this one, so this is sufficient. Note that this implies I∞ω(T ) =∞ trivially.
If there is no such type, one of two things happens. If T is non-small – that
is, S(T ) is uncountable – then ∼=T is ∼=2, the “equality relation on countable sets of
reals.” Correspondingly, I∞ω(T ) = i2. If T is small – that is, S(T ) is countable
– then ∼=T is smooth, and equivalent to the equality relation on κ, the number of
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countable models of T , which can also be computed directly by a type counting
argument. Curiously, κ can be 1, any finite number of the form 3a6b, or 2ℵ0 , but
cannot be ℵ0. In all of these cases, I∞ω(T ) = κ.
These values are significant. In case T is small, then ∼=T is the minimal value
among all theories with at least κ countable models. In case T is not small, ∼=T is
the minimal value among all non-small theorems (see Theorem 1.3 in [14]). Thus
in some important sense, ∼=T is either maximal or minimal. Also, among o-minimal
theories, I∞ω(T ) is always the “expected” value from the Borel complexity of ∼=T .
Therefore the divide is as sharp as it could be- (Mod(T ),∼=) is either maximal
among all isomorphism problems, or minimal among all problems with which it can
be reasonably compared.
We continue with two interesting corollaries to the main theorem. The first
states that any nontrivial o-minimal theory (in particular, any theory which defines
an infinite group) is λ-Borel complete. The second states that any discretely o-
minimal theory (or even one with an infinite discrete part) is λ-Borel complete.
Together, these imply and strengthen virtually all known Borel completeness results
for concrete examples of o-minimal theories.
We end with a section filled with examples to demonstrate the different kinds
of behavior which can occur, as well as settle a few easy questions one might ask
when comparing this case to colored linear orders (see Chapter 3) which admits a
very similar “main theorem” to this one.
These questions were originally explored in Dave Sahota’s PhD thesis [25],
where a partial form of the main result was shown and where many of the techniques
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here were first employed. In particular, he introduced the concept of faithfulness
and showed that the existence of a faithful type is sufficient for Borel completeness.
From there, given a nonsimple type over finitely many parameters, he added finitely
many more parameters to produce a faithful non-cut, yielding a Borel completeness
result for the extended theory. It is a major open problem whether this implies
Borel completeness for the original theory, however, and the thesis stopped there.
The main addition of this chapter, aside from extending the scope to I∞ω(T )
and to λ-Borel completeness, is to get around this issue of parameters. This requires
more refined analysis of cuts and substantially new ideas to deal with atomic inter-
vals (the canonical tail). Although Sahota finished his thesis before I was aware of
the problem, it was never published; thus, to recognize the contributions of both
authors, much of this work was published in [21] under both names.
2.1 Background
Throughout this chapter, T will refer to an o-minimal theory in a countable lan-
guage. We will not assume the underlying order is dense. However, as we will see
in Theorem 2.4.2, if the order has an infinite non-dense part, then there is a very
simple answer to our main question, which shows that T is λ-Borel complete for
all λ. Where relevant, we will work in a sufficiently saturated monster model from
which all parameters will be drawn; all models will be elementary substructures of
this monster model. When we say a set A or a tuple of elements b, we mean these
to be subsets or elements of this monster model.
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Since our models will be linearly ordered, for any set A, dcl(A) = acl(A). We
will refer to this shared value as cl(A). Since closure will be used so heavily in
this chapter, we define two extended notations. If A is any set, then clA(B) will
be cl(A ∪ B), where the intention is that A acts like a set of parameters. If p is a
partial type over A, then clpA(B) will be those elements of clA(B) which satisfy p.
Much of the basic theory of o-minimality was developed in [18] by Pillay
and Steinhorn and in [10] by Knight, Pillay, and Steinhorn. In particular, they
showed the cell decomposition theorem, the continuity-monotonicity theorem, and
the existence of (unique) constructible models over sets. Readers unfamiliar with
o-minimal theories are directed to [30] for a modern introduction to o-minimality.
For definitions – a structure M is o-minimal if < is a linear order of the
structure and, for all parameter-definable sets φ(x, a), φ(M, a) is a finite union of
points and open intervals. It is a nontrivial fact, shown in [18] and [10], that if
M ≡ N and M is o-minimal, then N is o-minimal as well. Thus we may say a
complete theory T is o-minimal if some (all) of its models are.
First, for cell decomposition. A 1-cell (over A) is either a single point in cl(A)
or an open interval whose endpoints are in cl(A). An n+ 1-cell V (over A) consists
of an n− 1-cell U over A and one of two things:
1. An A-definable partial function f , defined on U . Then V = {(x, y) : x ∈
U , f(x) = y}.
2. Two A-definable partial functions f and g, defined on U , where f(x) < g(x)
on U . Then V = {(x, y) : x ∈ U , f(x) < y < g(x)}.
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An n-cell is open if the underlying 1-cell is an open interval, and in higher
cases, we always take case (2). The cell-decomposition theorem states that for any
A-formulas φ1(x), . . . , φk(x), Mn can be A-definably divided into n-cells such that
φi(Mn) is a disjoint union of cells. The only usage of this theorem directly in this
chapter is the following easy consequence:
Proposition 2.1.1. Suppose a is a tuple, φ(x) is a formula over A, and φ(a) is
true. Then there is a n-cell U , definable over A, where a ∈ U and φ holds for all
elements of U .
Along with the cell-decomposition theorem is a corresponding statement for
functions. For general A-definable n-ary partial functions f1, . . . , fk, we can defin-
ably decomposeMn into n-cells over A such that for all i, dom(fi) is a disjoint union
of cells and where fi is continuous on each cell. When n = 1, we can do even better
and insist that on each cell, fi is not only continuous, but either constant, strictly
increasing, or strictly decreasing; this is call the continuity-monotonicity theorem.
The following is an easy consequence we will use frequently:
Proposition 2.1.2. Suppose A is a set and a and b are single elements outside
of cl(A). If f is an A-definable partial function and f(a) = b, then f is a strictly
monotone homeomorphism from the realizations of tp(a/A) to the realizations of
tp(b/A). We will refer to this condition as “f is a bijection from tp(a/A) to tp(b/A).”
It follows immediately that clA satisfies the Steinitz exchange axiom: for any
set A and any single elements a and b, if a ∈ cl(Ab) \ cl(A), then b ∈ cl(Aa). Thus
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for any sets A and B, dimA(B) is well-defined to be the cardinality of the largest
clA-independent subset of B.
A model M is constructible over A if A ⊂ M and there is an enumeration
(aα : α < δ) of M such that for all α, tp(aα/Aα) is isolated, where Aα = A ∪ {aβ :
β < α}. If there is a constructible model over A, then that model is the unique
prime model over A, up to isomorphism fixing A. When the underlying theory is
o-minimal, for all sets A (from some model), there is a constructible model over A
which we will denote Pr(A).
In [12], Marker identified the three kinds of complete nonalgebraic 1-types
which can arise. A complete 1-type p which has both a definable infimum L and
a supremum R is atomic, and is either algebraic (if L = R) or is generated by the
atomic interval (L,R); note that L or R may be among ±∞. If p has a definable
infimum or a definable supremum, but not both, then p is nonisolated and is called
a “non-cut.” Finally, if p has neither endpoint, then p is nonisolated and is called
a “cut.” It is easy to see that there are no definable bijections between types of
different “kinds.” From this observation Marker showed that if tp(a/A) is a non-cut
and q ∈ S1(A) is a cut, then the prime model over Aa omits q, and likewise when
exchanging cuts for non-cuts.
2.1.1 Nonsimplicity
Less well-known than the general theory but fundamental to our work here, is the
notion of nonsimplicity. This definition is due to Mayer and is central to her solution
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of Vaught’s conjecture for o-minimal theories in [15].
Definition 2.1.3. A type p ∈ S1(A) is simple if, for every set B of realizations of
p, clpA(B) is B.
Say p is nonsimple if p is not simple; that is, for some set B of realizations of
p, there is a b 6∈ B which realizes p and which is B-definable.
By compactness, if p is nonsimple, there is a finite set B satisfying the above.
In particular, we will say p is n-nonsimple if there is some B as above with |B| ≤ n.
We will say p is n-simple if there is no such set B. The following remark makes the
minimal nonsimplicity index very interesting:
Remark / Definition 2.1.4. If p is k-simple, then the type pk+1(x0, . . . , xk) gen-
erated by {x0 < · · · < xk} ∪
⋃k
i=0 p(xi) is complete.
If p is n-nonsimple, then there is some ascending n-tuple a of realizations of
p, and some element b which realizes p and is a-definable but is not in a. If n is
minimal such that p is n-nonsimple, then by the remark, pn is a complete type.
By combining these two facts, we get a definable function f : pn → p such that
f(a) = b.
While we will be very interested in particular nonsimple types, we are using
the existence of a nonsimple type as a property of the theory which forms the
most important dividing line for complexity. Since the use of parameters can be
a significant obstacle to descriptive set theoretic analysis, the following lemma is
extremely helpful:
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Lemma 2.1.5. Let A be a finite set, and suppose p ∈ S1(A) is n-nonsimple. Then
the restriction p0 of p to S1(∅) is is n+ |A|-nonsimple.
Proof. By an obvious inductive argument, we assume A is a singleton a, and p ∈
S1(a). Assume n is minimal such that p is n-nonsimple. By way of contradiction,
suppose that p0 is n + 1-simple. By nonsimplicity and the remark, there is an a-
definable function f : pn → p. In fact, we may take f to be f(x; y) such that f(x; a)
is a nontrivial function pn → p, and by exchange over a, may assume that f(x; a) is
defined on ascending tuples x1 < · · · < xn and satisfies f(x; a) > xn everywhere.
Suppose that clp0(a) is nonempty; that is, there is an a′ ∈ cl(a) which realizes
p0. But then by exchange, a ∈ cl(a′), so f(x; a) is a′-definable, witnessing n + 1-
nonsimplicity of p0. So it must be that p is equivalent to p0; therefore we take p = p0
for the remainder of the proof. Let q(y) = tp(a).
But now the type pn0 × q is complete, and f is a function pn0 × q → p0. By
exchange and the preparation above, we may replace f with a function g : pn+10 → q.
Assume g is of minimal arity with this property. Then for any b1 < · · · < bn from
p0, the function g(b;xn+1) is a bijection from the complete b-type p0(x) ∪ {x > bn}
to the complete b-type q.
Therefore, define the function h : pn+10 → p0 by h(x1, . . . , xn+1) to be the
unique y > xn+1 from p0 where g(x1, . . . , xn+1) = g(x2, . . . , xn+1, y); such a y must
exist and be greater than xn+1 by the above proof, yielding n + 1-nonsimplicity of
p0, as desired.
In fact, since functions require only finitely many parameters to be defined,
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if T admits a nonsimple type over any set, then T has a nonsimple type over the
empty set. Although we will not use it, the converse is also true – any nonsimple
type over any set A admits a nonsimple extension to any B ⊃ A. Therefore:
Corollary 2.1.6. For a complete o-minimal T , the following are equivalent:
• T admits a nonsimple type over ∅.
• T admits a nonsimple type over A, for some set A.
• T admits a nonsimple type over A, for every set A.
We will refer to any of the above conditions on T as admitting a nonsimple
type.
2.1.2 Outline
Most of the content of this chapter is in proving the following Theorem:
Theorem 2.1.7. Let T be a complete o-minimal theory in a countable language.
1. If T has no nonsimple types and S1(T ) is countable, then ∼=T is (3a6b,=) and
I∞ω(T ) = ‖T‖ = 3a6b, where a and b are the number of independent non-cuts
and cuts, respectively. Note that either or both could be infinite.
2. If T has no nonsimple types and S1(T ) is uncountable, then ∼=T is ∼=2 and
I∞ω(T ) = ‖T‖ = i2.
3. If T admits a nonsimple type, then (Mod(T ),∼=) is Borel complete and indeed
λ-Borel complete for all λ.
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First, we consider the case where T has no nonsimple types. We state and re-
prove Mayer’s characterization of isomorphism for such T . Then we go on to prove
the exact place in the Borel hierarchy for T by giving explicit Borel reductions into
the appropriate spaces.
The more complicated case is when T has a nonsimple type. In all cases,
we will give a λ-Borel reduction from (LO,∼=) into (Mod(T ),∼=). In essence, we
will give a λ-Borel function LO → Mod(T ) where L appears as the Archimedean
ladder of some nonsimple type inML. In actuality, this only works in the presence
of a faithful nonsimple type. The notion of faithfulness applies in different ways
depending on the ‘kind’ of nonsimple type we have, so we divide into cases based
on whether our nonsimple type is isolated or not.
If p is a nonsimple, nonisolated type, then either p is a non-cut or a cut. We
show that all nonsimple non-cuts are faithful, and that every cut is either faithful or
can be used to produce a nonsimple non-cut (which is necessarily faithful). When
p is isolated, there may be no faithful types anywhere. We exploit the idea that we
can add parameters to produce a non-cut, so that we can embed a linear order as
the ladder of this type. This will not be preserved under isomorphism of models,
but we show that such an embedding has a canonical tail which is preserved.
We then show that this is enough – there is a λ-Borel complete class of linear
orders where tail isomorphism is equivalent to actual isomorphism, so we can still
produce a Borel reduction from linear orders to T . Therefore, given a nonsimple
type, T must be λ-Borel complete for all λ.
We follow up with two corollaries which provide sufficient conditions for λ-
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Borel completeness. First, if the theory itself is nontrivial (regardless of whether
this happens in a single type), we can use exchange to produce a nonsimple type
over finitely many parameters. Second, if the underlying order is not almost dense
(that is, there are infinitely many non-dense points), we will be able to generate a
faithful nonsimple type over ∅, just using the successor function.
We end with a section of examples of o-minimal theories which exhibit several
types of behavior discussed in the main body of this chapter.
2.2 No Nonsimple Types
The aim of this section is to completely characterize the complexity of ∼=T in the
case that T does not admit a nonsimple type. Therefore, for the rest of this
section, T is a countable o-minimal theory with no nonsimple types. Our
characterization will depend entirely on the size of S1(T ) and the number of inde-
pendent cuts and non-cuts. To do this, consider the following definition, which is
implicit in [15]:
Definition 2.2.1. Let M and N be countable models of T . We say that M and
N are apparently isomorphic if, for every p ∈ S1(∅), p(M) ∼= p(N ) as linear orders.
Our characterization relies on two major facts; that “apparent” isomorphism
is equivalent to “actual” isomorphism, and that apparent isomorphism is a relatively
simple thing to compute.
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2.2.1 Apparent Isomorphism is Equivalent to Isomorphism
We begin by summarizing the part of Mayer’s work which is relevant to us. All
results and definitions in this subsection are due to her and proved in [15], although
the exposition is new.
Lemma 2.2.2. Given countable models M and N of T , M∼= N if and only if M
and N are apparently isomorphic.
This lemma follows from a back-and-forth argument using the following lemma
as an inductive step:
Lemma 2.2.3 (Mayer). Suppose M and N are countable models of T and A is a
finite set of parameters in M ∩N where, for all p ∈ S1(A), p(M) ∼= p(N ) as linear
orders. Then, for any a ∈ M, there is a b ∈ N such that tp(a) = tp(b) and for all
q(x; y) ∈ S2(A), q(M; a) ∼= q(N ; b) as linear orders.
Proof. Let M and N be as described; clearly we may assume A = ∅ by adding it
into the language. Let a ∈M be arbitrary, and for every p ∈ S1(∅), let fp : p(M)→
p(N ) be an order isomorphism as guaranteed by hypothesis.
First, note that any ∅-definable function between complete 1-types must be a
continuous, strictly monotone bijection, either order-preserving or order-reversing;
this follows from the continuity-monotonicity theorem and the fact that both types
are complete. Next, note that since all types are simple, there is at most one ∅-
definable function between any two 1-types, since if f, g : p → q are distinct, then
g−1 ◦ f : p→ p makes p nonsimple. As a consequence, for every type p, there is at
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most one element a′ ∈ cl(a) which realizes p. The same holds for any b in N .
With all this said, fix p = tp(a) and let b = fp(a) ∈ N . Observe that
tp(a) = tp(b) = p. We argue that this choice of b works; that for any q(x; y) ∈ S2(∅),
q(M; a) ∼= q(N ; b). By the previous paragraph, every type over ∅ either stays
the same or splits into two convex pieces. If q(x; a) is equivalent to its restriction
q0 to ∅, then so is q(x; b), and they are already isomorphic under fq. If it does
split, then there is an a′ ∈ cl(a) which realizes q0, so there is a unique ∅-definable
homeomorphism f : p → q0 where f(a) = a′. Observe that f works in N as well,
and q(x; b) splits into two pieces over b′ = f(b).
Assume that f : p → q0 is strictly decreasing (the strictly increasing case is
similar). Then f is a strictly decreasing bijection p ∪ {x > a} → q0 ∪ {x < a′} and
p∪{x < a} → q0∪{x > a′}, and similarly for b and b′ inN . So f◦fp◦f−1 is an order-
preserving bijection q0∪{x < a′} → q0∪{x < b′} and q0∪{x > a′} → q0∪{x > b′}.
Since q(x; a) is either q0∪{x < a′} or q0∪{x > a′}, and q(x; b) similarly, the function
f ◦ fp ◦ f−1 is the desired order-isomorphism q(M; a) → q(N ; b), completing the
proof.
It only remains to prove that “apparent isomorphism” is a comparatively sim-
ple notion to compute. To that end, consider the following lemma:
Lemma 2.2.4. [Mayer] For any simple p ∈ S1(∅) and any countable M |= T , if
a, b ∈ p(M) and a < b, then there is a c ∈ p(M) with a < c < b.
Therefore, p(M) is order-isomorphic to one of six countable linear orders.
Proof. First, suppose p(M) has at least two elements, a < b. If a has an immediate
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successor, then at most b, and by convexity of p, every realization of p has an
immediate successor which realizes p. Therefore, the successor function is a ∅-
definable witness to p being 1-nonsimple (against hypothesis). Thus this cannot
happen, so no element of p(M) has an immediate successor or predecessor.
Therefore, either |p(M)| ≤ 1 (yielding two possible isomorphism types) or
p(M) is a dense linear order. In this case, two choices remain with respect to
endpoints, and therefore four more possible options for the isomorphism type of
p(M), for a total of six.
As a consequence, two models M and N are apparently isomorphic if and
only if, for every type p ∈ S1(∅) which is realized in M or N , if p(M) has a first
element (or last element, or sole element), then so does p(N ), and vice-versa.
2.2.2 The Complexity of Isomorphism for Theories With No Non-
simple Types
With both models in hand, computing apparent isomorphism is not especially dif-
ficult. Determining precisely how difficult leads to the following characterization:
Theorem 2.2.5. Suppose T is o-minimal with no nonsimple types.
• If there are c pairwise-independent cuts and n pairwise-independent non-cuts
over ∅, both finite, then ∼=T is Borel equivalent to (3n6c,=). Additionally,
I∞ω(T ) = 3
n6c.
• If there are an infinite but countable number of pairwise-independent non-
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isolated 1-types over ∅, then ∼=T is Borel equivalent to ∼=1. Additionally,
I∞ω(T ) = i1.
• If S1(T ) is uncountable, then ∼=T is Borel equivalent to ∼=2. Additionally,
I∞ω(T ) = i2.
To be precise, we should define independence. Two complete, nonalgebraic
types p and q (over A) are dependent if there is an A-definable function f which
takes realizations of p to realizations of q. A set Γ ⊂ S1(T ) is independent if no
pair of types in Γ is dependent. In [15], a more complicated notion of dependence
was given so that a type could depend on finitely many others. This will never
be necessary because of Theorem 2.4.1, which states that if T is nontrivial then
T admits a nonsimple type (this is not circular). Consequently dependence is an
equivalence relation on complete types over a set A, and the equivalence classes have
size at most ℵ0 + |A|. Additionally, though we will not need it specifically, cuts can
only depend on cuts, and likewise with non-cuts and atomic intervals.
For the first and second points, we need only show that if T is small, then
T is smooth. In this case the Borel equivalence class of T is defined exactly by
the number of nonisomorphic countable models of T , a count which has already
been done in [15], where the notion of “pairwise-independent” is also made precise.
Moreover, the computation of I∞ω(T ) follows immediately from Proposition 1.2.18.
Lemma 2.2.6. If S1(T ) is countable and has no nonsimple types, then T is smooth.
Proof. We need a Borel function F : Mod(ω, T ) → X, for some Polish space X,
where M1 ∼= M2 iff F (M1) = F (M2). So let X = 6S1(T ), which is a countable
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product of Polish spaces and is therefore Polish. Fix an enumeration of the six
possible countable dense linear orders, and for any M |= T and p ∈ S1(T ), let
F (M)(p) be the index of the order-type of p(M). This function is clearly Borel and
satisfies the requirements.
For the third point, it’s enough to show that if S1(T ) is uncountable, then
T ≤
B
∼=2. For as has already been mentioned, ∼=2 embeds into ∼=T whenever T is not
small.
Lemma 2.2.7. If S1(T ) is uncountable, then ∼=T≤B∼=2.
Proof. Since T is not small, X = S1(T )× 6 is an uncountable Polish space. We will
produce a Borel function F : Mod(ω, T )→ Xω such that M1 ∼=M2 iff {F (M1)n :
n ∈ ω} and {F (M2)n : n ∈ ω} are equal as sets.
To that end, fix an enumeration of the six possible countable dense linear
orders, and define F (M)(n) be (tpM(n), k), where k is the index of the isomorphism
type of tpM(n)(M). This function is again Borel, and two models yield the same
set of sequence values if and only if they are apparently isomorphic.
Unfortunately, Marker’s theorem does not give any information about I∞ω(T ).
We can do this ourselves without much extra effort:
Lemma 2.2.8. If S1(T ) is uncountable, then I∞ω(T ) = i2.
Proof. First, observe that almost isomorphism is absolute. Thus, if two models
(of any cardinality) are almost isomorphic, then in any forcing extension in which
both are countable, they are still almost isomorphic, and thus isomorphic (in the
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forcing extension), so back-and-forth equivalent (in the forcing extension), and thus
back-and-forth equivalent (in the ground model) since back-and-forth equivalence
is absolute. It is easy to see that there are only i2 possible almost-isomorphism
classes of models of T , indexed by functions from S1(T ) to 6, so I∞ω(T ) ≤ i2. The
other direction is less trivial.
Dependence among types is an equivalence relation with countably many
classes. Since S1(T ) is uncountable, it has size continuum, and thus there is a
set X ⊂ S1(T ) of size continuum consisting of nonalgebraic, nonisolated, mutually
independent types. For each Y ⊂ X, let CY be a set of constants from the monster
model consisting of one realization of each type in Y , and nothing else. The prime
model MY over CY will realize each type in Y . If p ∈ X\Y is realized in MY by some
element a, then for some finite c from CY , tp(ac) is isolated. Since p is nonisolated
and tp(a/c) extends it, this means there is a b ∈ cl(c) which realizes p. By triviality
of T (see Theorem 2.4.1; this is not circular), this means p is mutually dependent
with some type in Y , against construction of X. This contradiction shows that p is
omitted in MY .
Thus, if Y1 and Y2 are distinct subsets of X, then MY1 and MY2 realize different
types, so are not back-and-forth equivalent. Since |X| = i1, |P(X)| = i2, so
I∞ω(T ) ≥ i2, as desired. Note that a more delicate form of this argument would
show that ∼=2≤B T , along essentially the same lines as the proof of Marker’s theorem
in [14].
This proves the main results for this section, as well as the following unexpected
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corollary, which gives another way in which these theories are dominated by their
1-types:
Corollary 2.2.9. Let T be o-minimal with no nonsimple types. T is small if and
only if S1(T ) is countable.
Proof. If T is small, then S(T ) is countable, so S1(T ) ⊆ S(T ) is countable. If T is
not small, then F2 ≤B T , so T is not smooth, so S1(T ) is uncountable.
2.3 A Nonsimple Type
Our goal for this section is to show that if T is a countable o-minimal theory which
admits a nonsimple type, then the ∼=T is λ-Borel complete. Therefore, for the
rest of this section, T is a countable o-minimal theory which admits a
nonsimple type. Since the isomorphism relation on linear orders (of size λ) is
known to be λ-Borel complete, our goal will be to show a λ-Borel reduction from
linear orders to T .
Given a complete type p over some set A, and for any set B ⊃ A, define
an Archimedean equivalence relation on realizations of p as follows: given a and
b realizing p, say a ∼B b if there are a1, a2 ∈ clpB(a) and b1, b2 ∈ cl
p
B(b) such that
a1 ≤ b ≤ a2 and b1 ≤ a ≤ b2. For our purposes, A will usually be ∅. In the quite
common case that A = B = ∅, we will omit the subscript on ∼.
This is easily seen to be an equivalence relation. Moreover, the equivalence
classes are convex, and thus they are totally ordered. As a result, given any model
M of T which contains B, the quotient p(M)/ ∼B is a linear order. We call this
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the Archimedean ladder. If A = B = ∅, this is an invariant of the model which is
preserved under isomorphism. Assuming we can construct models with arbitrary
countable ladders, and do this in a λ-Borel fashion, we can give a λ-Borel reduction
from linear orders to T and show λ-Borel completeness.
The next step toward this is the notion of faithfulness:
Definition 2.3.1. A nonsimple type p ∈ S1(A) is faithful if, for any set B of
realizations of p which are pairwise ∼A-inequivalent, and any c ∈ clpA(B), c ∼A b for
some b ∈ B.
Approximately, “faithfulness” says that given some realizations of p, you can’t
access anything too fundamentally different. In particular, you can’t access any new
Archimedean classes. Since o-minimal theories have constructible models over sets,
this gives a technique: given a countable linear order L, pick a faithful type p ∈ S1(∅)
and a set of ∼-inequivalent constants which realize p, and which are indexed and
ordered by L. The constructible model over this set of constants will have ladder
exactly isomorphic to L, and we’re done. The details will be shown later, but there
is no hidden difficulty. The problem is finding a faithful type at all.
Our first stage is to show that if there is a nonisolated nonsimple type over ∅,
then there is a faithful nonsimple type over ∅. It turns out all nonsimple non-cuts
are 1-nonsimple, and all 1-nonsimple non-cuts are faithful, so if there is a nonsimple
non-cut, there is a faithful type. Neither of these properties are true for cuts, but if
there is an unfaithful cut over ∅, then we can use it to produce a nonsimple non-cut
over ∅. So if T admits any nonisolated nonsimple type, we can produce a faithful
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type and conclude that T is λ-Borel complete.
This does not completely resolve the question, however. Consider the theory
of ordered, affinized divisible abelian groups (Example 2.5.9). In this case, the
only 1-type over ∅ is given by the atomic formula x = x, which is 1-simple but 2-
nonsimple. No such type can be faithful, so this theory admits no faithful types over
∅. However, if we add two parameters (call them 0 and 1), there is a resulting non-
cut “at infinity,” which is faithful by the work above. We can build a ladder in this
non-cut by faithfulness, but because the definition of the type relies on parameters,
it will not be preserved under isomorphism. To deal with this, we introduce the
notion of a canonical tail:
Definition 2.3.2. Let p ∈ S1(T ) be an atomic nonsimple type, and let n be minimal
where p is n-nonsimple. Say p has a canonical tail if, for all sets A and B from p of
size n, ∼A and ∼B coincide above clp(AB). That is, for all elements c, d from p, if
c, d > clp(AB), then c ∼A d if and only if c ∼B d.
The problem from before is that if we use parameters to construct a ladder,
it will not be preserved under isomorphism. However, if the atomic type has a
canonical tail, then any isomorphism between suitably chosen models will preserve
a tail of the intended linear order. With this in mind, we will first show that
every nonsimple atomic type has a canonical tail. Next, we will construct a λ-
Borel complete class of linear orders on which isomorphism and sharing a tail are
the same notion, and use this to show that an atomic type with a canonical tail
provides λ-Borel completeness.
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Combining these two ideas shows that if T is a countable, o-minimal theory
which admits a nonsimple type, then T is λ-Borel complete for all λ.
2.3.1 A Nonsimple Nonisolated Type
Our goal in this section is to show that if T admits a nonsimple nonisolated type
over ∅, then T admits a faithful nonisolated type over ∅. There are two distinct cases
– non-cuts and cuts. Before we prove our needed results, we will need one lemma
which is used frequently and without explicit mention. Note that in this lemma and
all that follow, we can also work with types over parameters with no change in the
argument.
Lemma 2.3.3. If p ∈ S1(T ) is n-nonsimple, then for any set B of realizations of
p with |B| ≥ n, clp(B) has no first or last element. Further, if p is 1-simple, then
clp(B) is a dense linear order.
Proof. Let n be minimal where p is n-nonsimple, and let a = a1 < · · · < an be
realizations of p. By n-nonsimplicity, there is a b ∈ clp(a) which is not in a. By
exchange, any of the elements of ab is definable over the other n. By minimality of
n, this yields functions fi : p
n → p for i = 0, 1, . . . , n where f0(a) < a1 < f1(a) <
· · · < an < fn(a).
In particular, f0(a) < a1 and an < fn(a), so no sufficiently large set’s closure
has a first or last element. Furthermore, if n ≥ 2, then we can use f1 to get between
a1 and a2, establishing density.
Lemma 2.3.4. If p ∈ S1(T ) is a nonsimple non-cut, then p is 1-nonsimple.
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Proof. We assume p is a left non-cut, with definable supremum L; the infimum
case is symmetric. Let n be minimal such that p is n-nonsimple. By exchange and
minimality of n, construct f(x) : pn → p such that if x = x1 < · · · < xn are all from
p, then xn < f(x) < L. Then f is defined and has this property on a convex set
below L, so there is a b ∈ cl(∅) where if b < x1 < · · · < xn < L, then f(x) is defined
and xn < f(x) < L.
But since p is a non-cut, cl(∅) approaches L from the left, so there are elements
a1 < · · · < an−1 from cl(∅) satisfying b < a1 < · · · < an−1 < L. So the function
g(x) = f(a1, . . . , an−1, x) is a nonsimple function from p to p such that x < g(x),
establishing 1-nonsimplicity.
Lemma 2.3.5. If p ∈ S1(T ) is a nonsimple non-cut, then p is faithful.
Proof. Suppose p is unfaithful. We may assume p has a supremum L; the infimum
case is symmetric. By unfaithfulness, there is a tuple a1 < · · · < an of realizations
of p where [a1] < · · · < [an] and where there is a b ∈ clp(a) such that b 6∼ ai for
any i = 1, . . . , n. We assume n is minimal with this property. Clearly n > 1. By
exchange, we may assume b < a1. Let A = {a1, . . . , an−1}.
By minimality of n, b cannot be defined over a proper subset of a; thus, every
point of ab is definable over the other n. Also, observe that tp(b/c) is a cut (p
is nonsimple, so the closure of a nonempty set has no first or last element), while
tp(an/Ab) is a non-cut. Both are nonisolated over A, so neither is realized in Pr(A).
Yet tp(an/A) is realized in Pr(Ab), indicating that tp(an/A) is isolated over Ab, so
there is some element of cl(Ab) which realizes tp(an/A). This means there is an
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A-definable function from a cut over A to a non-cut over A, which is impossible.
Thus, if there is a nonsimple non-cut, we are done. We will now address the
issue of nonsimple cuts, which are not as convenient as non-cuts:
Lemma 2.3.6. If a cut p ∈ S1(T ) is nonsimple, then it is 2-nonsimple.
Proof. Suppose not. That is, let p ∈ S1(T ) be a nonsimple cut, and let n be minimal
such that p is n-nonsimple, and such that n ≥ 3.
By exchange and minimality of n, there is a ∅-definable function f : pn → p,
defined on ascending n-tuples from p, such that if x1 < · · · < xn are realizations of
p, then x1 < f(x) < x2 < · · · < xn. Then these properties hold on a convex set, so
hold on a ∅-definable open interval I = (a, b) containing p. Since cl(∅) approaches
p from the right, we can choose elements c3 < · · · < cn from cl(∅) where cn < b and
p(x) implies x < c3.
Then the function g(x1, x2) = f(x1, x2, c3, . . . , cn) is ∅-definable and defined
on the interval (a, c3). Further, if x1 < x2 realize p, then x1 < g(x1, x2) < x2, so by
convexity of p, g(x1, x2) realizes p as well, establishing 2-nonsimplicity of p.
Note that this lemma is best-possible; Example 2.5.6 gives a nonsimple cut
which is 1-simple. The binary function making this cut nonsimple is an averaging
function, which “spills over” to nearby non-cuts and makes them nonsimple instead
(and thus a faithful type is exhibited). This behavior turns out to be completely
general:
Lemma 2.3.7. If p ∈ S1(T ) is a nonsimple, 1-simple cut, then there is a faithful
non-cut q ∈ S1(T ).
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Proof. Let n be minimal such that p is n-nonsimple. By hypothesis and Lemma 2.3.6
we may conclude that n = 2. By exchange, there is a function g : p2 → p where
if x < y and both realize p, then x < g(x, y) < y. But then this property holds
on an ∅-definable interval I containing p. Since cl(∅) approaches p from the right,
let c ∈ cl(∅) be some element such that c ∈ I and p(x) implies x < c. Then the
function g(x, c) is ∅-definable, defined on the open interval (a, c) which includes p,
and if a < x < c, then x < g(x, c) < c.
Since cl(∅) approaches p from the right, let c′ ∈ cl(∅) be such that p(x) < c′ < c.
Then the set {y ∈ cl(∅) : a < y < c} is nonempty, and because g(x, c) is ∅-definable,
it must therefore approach c from the left. So the type q(x) = {x < c} ∪ {x > y :
y ∈ cl(∅) ∧ y < c} is a non-cut, and is nonsimple under the function g(x, c). By
Lemma 2.3.5, q is faithful, completing the proof.
Of course a cut need not be faithful; the example of a 1-simple, 2-nonsimple
cut exhibits this. However, Example 2.5.8 shows that even if a cut is 1-nonsimple, it
may be unfaithful due to the presence of a function of larger arity. In that example,
the binary function “overspills” and makes nearby non-cuts nonsimple, as before.
This is again completely general, but the proof is more delicate than before. We
will temporarily require the notion of n-unfaithfulness ; the property of a type which
says that it is unfaithful, and there is a witness of length at most n.
Lemma 2.3.8. If a cut p ∈ S1(T ) is 1-nonsimple but 2-unfaithful, then for any b
realizing p, the non-cut below b is 1-nonsimple as a type over b.
Proof. Suppose that p is 2-unfaithful, and pick a witnessing pair. That is, there is
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some pair [a] < [b] from p and a ∅-definable g(x, y) where [a] < [g(a, b)] < [b]. We
will show that the non-cut (b)− is 1-nonsimple as a b-type.
Since the type r(x, y) = p(x) ∪ p(y) ∪ {[x] < [y]} is complete, g witnesses un-
faithfulness for every sufficiently spread pair. In particular, g is defined, continuous,
strictly increasing in both of its arguments, and satisfies x < g(x, y) < y everywhere
on this type. We may therefore consider a ∅-definable open 2-cell U(x, y) containing
the descending pair (b, a) (order intentional) on which these properties are satisfied.
Its underlying interval must contain all of p(x), and its boundary functions L(x)
and R(x) are everywhere defined on p(x).
Then L(b) < a < R(b); since [a] < [b] in p(x), this means L(b) is beyond the
left edge of p(x), so there is an element of cl(∅) which is strictly between p and
every value that L(x) can take on p. Thus we may assume that L(x) is a constant
function whose value lies below p. In particular, if (x, y) are from p, then the pair
is in U if and only if y < R(x). Since R(b) ≤ b, R(y) ≤ y for all y realizing p, so R
is a strictly increasing function p→ p.
Consider the function g(R(x), y). If y realizes p and x ∈ (y)−, then x < y,
so R(x) < R(y), so g(R(x), y) is defined. Since g is strictly increasing in both
arguments and R is strictly increasing, the composition will be strictly increasing
in both of its arguments. If we fix y (as b, for example), then since the function
is strictly increasing in x, it must be a bijection from (y)− to some other non-cut
(f(y))− for some ∅-definable function f : p→ p. Therefore h(x, y) = f−1(g(R(x), y))
is a function (y)− → (y)−; it only remains to show it’s not equal to the identity
function x.
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But if it is – that is, if h(x, y) = x for all x ∈ (y)− – then f(x) = g(R(x), y) for
all y and all x ∈ (y)−. This is impossible, since g(R(x), y) is strictly increasing in
y, but the equality would imply g(R(x), y) is locally constant in y, a contradiction
[note that g(R(x), y) has an open domain, so the notion of being locally strictly
increasing or locally constant in y does make sense]. In particular, h(x, b) is a
nontrivial b-definable function from (b)− to itself, completing the proof.
By repeatedly applying the previous lemma, we can produce a faithful non-cut
from any unfaithful cut:
Lemma 2.3.9. If p ∈ S1(T ) is an unfaithful cut, then there is a faithful non-cut
q(x) ∈ S1(T ).
Proof. Let p ∈ S1(T ) be unfaithful. We may assume p is 1-nonsimple. Fix a tuple
from p of minimal length which witnesses unfaithfulness; this length must be at
least two, so we label it [a] < [b] < [c1] < · · · < [ck] where k ≥ 0, such that for
some ∅-definable f(x, y, z), [a] < [f(a, b, c)] < [b]. The type q(x) = p(x) ∪ {[x] <
[c1]} is a complete c-type which is 2-unfaithful under the function f(x, y, c), so
by Lemma 2.3.8, there is a bc-definable function g(x, b, c) where if x ∈ (b)−, then
x < g(x, b, c) < b.
This is a definable property, so pick a k + 1-cell U containing the tuple
(b, c1, . . . , ck) such that if (y, z1, . . . , zk) is in U , and if x ∈ (y)−, then x < g(x, y, z) <
y. Thus there are ∅-definable functions L(y, z1, . . . , zk−1) and R(y, z1, . . . , zk−1) such
that L(b, c1, . . . , ck−1) < ck < R(b, c1, . . . , ck−1). By minimality of the length of the
unfaithful tuple and the fact that [ck−1] < [ck], R is above p entirely. Thus there
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is an element dk ∈ cl(∅) such that (b, c1, . . . , ck−1, dk) ∈ U , and therefore, that if
x ∈ (b)−, then x < g(x, b, c1, . . . , ck−1, dk) < b.
Continuing in this way, we see that the boundary functions must always jump
over the end of the type, and therefore can be replaced by constant functions. That
is, we can replace all the ci in g(x, y, c) with elements of cl(∅). So there is a ∅-
definable g(x, y) where for any y from p, and any x ∈ (y)−, x < g(x, y) < y.
Since this property holds on an infinite set, it holds on an interval I, which must
necessarily include all of p. Since cl(∅) approaches p from the right, there is an
element b′ ∈ cl(∅) which is in I. But then the ∅-definable function g(x, b′) is a
function from the ∅-definable non-cut (b′)− to itself, completing the proof.
Thus we have shown that if there is a nonsimple nonisolated type, there is a
faithful nonisolated type. It is tempting to conjecture, based on all we have shown,
that if there is a nonsimple cut, there must be a nonsimple non-cut. However,
Example 2.5.7 shows this is not the case – the theory has a nonsimple (faithful) cut,
but no nonsimple non-cuts or atomic intervals. Thus, the above seems to be the
most direct path to the conclusion of this Subsection:
Lemma 2.3.10. If T admits a nonisolated nonsimple type over ∅, then T admits a
faithful type over ∅.
We will use this fact in Subsection 2.3.4.
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2.3.2 A Nonsimple Isolated Type
Our goal in this subsection is to show that if there is a nonsimple, atomic type
over ∅, then that type has a canonical tail. Throughout, p will refer to a nonsimple
atomic type, and I will refer to the atomic interval which generates it. We will refer
to the left and right endpoints of I as −∞ and ∞, respectively, though they may
actually be standard elements of the structure. Throughout this section, clI(A) will
refer to the closure of A within I; this is used instead of p to emphasize that p is
isolated.
Because of the restrictions in Lemma 2.3.3, the cases where this type is 1-
nonsimple and 1-simple are fairly different. We deal with the 1-nonsimple case first.
Lemma 2.3.11. If p ∈ S1(T ) is a 1-nonsimple atomic type, then p has a canonical
tail.
Proof. Suppose not. Then there are a, b, c, d in I, such that c, d > clI(ab) and c ∼a d
but c 6∼b d. Clearly c 6∼ d, so by symmetry, we may assume that [c] < [d]. Then
there is a definable function f(x, y) such that f(c, a) ≥ d. By completeness of the
c-type {x ∈ I} ∪ {[x] < [c]}, f(c, y) is strictly monotone and continuous on the
interval (−∞, c′) for some c′ ∈ clI(c). If f(c, y) is strictly increasing in y, then pick
any c′′ < c′ in clI(c), observing that a < c′′, so f(c, c′′) > f(c, a) ≥ d, so that c ∼ d
(and therefore c ∼b d as well, a contradiction).
Therefore f(c, y) is strictly decreasing in y. If b < a then f(c, b) > f(c, a) ≥ d
so c ∼b d again; therefore a < b. If a ∼ b, then there is b′ ≤ a in clI(b), so that
f(c, b′) ≥ f(c, a) ≥ d, a contradiction. So [a] < [b], and in fact [a] < [b] < [c] < [d].
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Let a′ = f(b, a), defined since [a] < [b]. By construction of f , [a] < [b] < [a′] <
[c] < [d]. Since cl(ab) = cl(ba′) and c ∼a d, c ∼ab d, so c ∼ba′ d. Therefore, there is
a b-definable function g(x, y) where g(a′, c) ≥ d. But all of the elements a′, c and d
come from the non-cut q(x) above cl(b) and below ∞. Therefore, we may say that
c ∼a′ d in this non-cut q(x), which is over b. Further, a′ and c are inequivalent in
q(x): if they were equivalent, then c would be bounded by cl(ba′) = cl(ab), against
hypothesis. But then by faithfulness of q(x), c ∼ d in q(x), implying c ∼b d.
We can now deal with the 1-simple case by an inductive argument, using both
clauses of Lemma 2.3.3 freely.
Lemma 2.3.12. If p ∈ S1(T ) is nonsimple and atomic, then p has a canonical tail.
Proof. Let n be minimal such that p is n-nonsimple. By Lemma 2.3.11, we may
assume n ≥ 2. We use the following claim as an inductive step:
Claim 1. Let a, c, d realize p, and let |A| ≥ n be a set of realizations of p. Suppose
c, d > clp(Aa) and c ∼Aa d. Then c ∼A d as well.
Proof of Claim 1. Let A, a, c, and d be as described, and suppose c 6∼A d. Since
c ∼Aa d, there is an A-definable function f(x, y) such that f(c, a) ≥ d. Since c 6∼A d,
[c] < [d] in the non-cut (∞)−A, the type {x ∈ I} ∪ {x > a′ : a′ ∈ cl
I(A)}.
First, consider the case where a realizes this type. Then because c > clI(Aa),
it must be that [a] < [c] < [d] in (∞)−A. Since f(a, c) ∈ cl
I
A(ac), we conclude
f(a, c) ∼A a by faithfulness of non-cuts, so d ∼A c by convexity of ∼A classes. Thus
it only remains to show a lies in (∞)−A.
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Second, suppose tp(a/A) is a non-cut at some L ∈ clI(A), which may be ±∞;
say a ∈ (L)− for concreteness. Then the formula limy→L− f(x, y) = ∞ is satisfied
when c = x, and therefore is satisfied by all x which are sufficiently large over A.
So pick some c′ ∈ clI(A) where limx→L− f(c′, x) = ∞. Let a′ = f(c′, a). Then
f(c′, a) ∈ cl(Aa) \ cl(A), so cl(Aa) = cl(Aa′), so c ∼Aa′ d. Moreover, tp(a′/A) is
(∞)−, so by the first case (using a′ in place of a), c ∼A d.
Third, suppose tp(a/Ac) is a cut. Then the function f(c, y) must be strictly
monotone at a, else f(a, c) ∈ cl(Ac), so c ∼A d. But since tp(a/Ac) is a cut, clI(Ac)
approaches a on both sides, in particular touching the “nice domain” of f(c, y) on
both sides. So if f(c, y) is strictly increasing at a, then pick an a′ ∈ cl(Ac) above a
and in the “nice domain,” noting that f(c, a′) > f(c, a) ≥ d, so c ∼A d. The strictly
decreasing case is similar.
Since n ≥ 2, by Lemma 2.3.3, clI(A) and clI(Ac) are dense, so neither tp(a/A)
nor tp(a/Ac) is an atomic interval. Clearly neither is algebraic, so by exhaustion
of cases, we may assume tp(a/A) is a cut and tp(a/Ac) is a non-cut. This means
there is an element L ∈ clI(Ac) where (we may assume) a ∈ (L)−, but L 6∈ clI(A)
(the case a ∈ (L)+ is similar). Then there is a function g over A which sends c to L
and which is locally strictly monotone at c. However, tp(c/A) is (∞)−A, a non-cut,
while tp(L/A) = tp(a/A) is a cut, so no such function exists. This contradiction
completes our proof. (Claim 1)
The lemma follows immediately from the claim. Let A and B be n-element
sets of realizations of p. Let c and d realize p and satisfy c, d > clp(AB). If c ∼A d,
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then trivially c ∼AB d as well. By applying the claim n times, we can remove all
elements of A from consideration and conclude c ∼B d, establishing the canonical
tail.
2.3.3 A Useful Class of Linear Orders
This subsection is a temporary departure from model theory. We need to produce a
subclass of the class of linear orders on λ such that (LOλ,≡∞ω) is λ-Borel reducible
to it, and where for any L1 and L2, if L1 and L2 are back-and-forth equivalent on a
tail, then L1 and L2 are back-and-forth equivalent. We do this by giving two λ-Borel
maps f and g from LO to itself, so that the class will be the image of g ◦ f .
We define a tail of a linear order L to be any interval of the form [a,∞),
interpreted in L, where a is in L.1 Two orders L1 and L2 are tail-equivalent, or
back-and-forth equivalent on a tail, if there are tails E1 of L1 and E2 of L2 such
that E1 ≡∞ω E2 as linear orders.
To define the maps, first define the order X = {0}∪{x ∈ Q : 1 ≤ x ≤ 2}∪{3},
with the inherited order from Q. Then define f : LO → LO by L 7→ L × X, with
the lexicographic order. That is, f expands every point of L to a copy of X.
Lemma 2.3.13. For any linear orders L1 and L2, L1 ∼= L2 if and only if f(L1) ∼=
f(L2).
Proof. The left-to-right direction is obvious. For the right-to-left direction, observe
that the set {(x, 1)} ⊂ f(L) of “1-points” is uniformly definable by the formula
1The reason we use this notion of tail, rather than the more-convenient “upwards closed set,” is
that this way, tail-equivalence is more obviously absolute. This will be useful almost immediately.
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which expresses “there is a unique predecessor, but there is an interval to the right
which is pure dense.” Further, this is order-isomorphic to L itself under the map
(x, 1) 7→ x. Therefore, if f(L1) ∼= f(L2), then the “1-points” of f(L1) are isomorphic
to the “1-points” of f(L2), so L1 ∼= L2.
Next, define g : LO → LO by L 7→ ω × (L ∪ {∞}), where ∞ is some point
not in L which is above every point in L. That is, g stacks up ω copies of L,
with a separating “∞-point” between each one; in particular each ∞-point has an
immediate “next” ∞-point. We will show that these ∞-points are (eventually)
definable, even on tails. Therefore, if g(f(L1)) and g(f(L2)) are isomorphic on a
tail, then we can match up consecutive ∞-points between the tails, and get an
isomorphism between f(L1) and f(L2).
Lemma 2.3.14. For any linear orders L1 and L2, the following are equivalent:
1. L1 ∼= L2,
2. g(f(L1)) and g(f(L2)) are isomorphic, and
3. g(f(L1)) and g(f(L2)) are isomorphic on a tail.
Proof. Two of the implications are obvious; it remains to show that if g(f(L1)) and
g(f(L2)) are isomorphic on a tail, then L1 ∼= L2. We will need a claim:
Claim 1. Let L be any countable linear order. There is a {<}-formula φ(v) such
that for any tail E of g(f(L)), there is a point b ∈ E such that, φ(E) ∩ (b,∞) is
exactly the set of “∞-points” above b.
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Proof of Claim 1. Let E = [a,∞) be some tail of g(f(L)). Let b be the first∞-point
satisfying b > a. On [b,∞), every point which is not an∞-point has a neighborhood
which is isomorphic to f(L); therefore, any formula which gave its “class” before
– as a 0-point, a 1-point, a 2-point, a 3-point, or a “pure dense” point – will still
apply here. More precisely:
The pure dense points are exactly those satisfying the formula stating “there
is an open neighborhood around v which is pure dense.” The 1-points are exactly
those stating “v is not pure dense, but there is a right-neighborhood which consists
entirely of pure dense points,” and the 2-points are defined symmetrically to the 1-
points. The 0-points are exactly those stating “v has an immediate successor which
is a 1-point,” and the 3-points are defined symmetrically to the 0-points.
Let c be any ∞-point above b. Then every left-neighborhood c contains in-
finitely many 0-points, and thus is neither pure dense nor empty, so c does not
satisfy the defining formulas for pure dense points, 2-points, or 3-points. If L has
no first element, then the right neighborhoods of c will have the same properties.
Otherwise, if L does have a first element, then the immediate successor of c will be a
0-point. Either way, c does not satisfy the defining formulas of 0-points or 1-points.
So let φ(v) be the negation of all the above defining formulas. Then for all
x > b, φ holds on x if and only if x is an ∞-point. φ(v) is defined independent of
everything, completing the proof. (Claim 1)
With this in mind, suppose g(f(L1)) and g(f(L2)) are isomorphic on a tail, say
[a1,∞) ∼= [a2,∞). Fix an isomorphism σ : [a1,∞)→ [a2,∞). Let b1 ∈ g(f(L1)) and
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b2 ∈ g(f(L2)) be as in the claim. Since σ is an order-isomorphism, it preserves φ. Let
c > max(b1, σ
−1(b2)) be some∞-point, and let c′ be the next∞-point after c. Then
the interval (c, c′) is order-isomorphic to f(L1). Also, σ(c) and σ(c
′) are consecutive
∞-points in g(f(L2)) by construction, so (σ(c), σ(c′)) is order-isomorphic to f(L2).
Since σ is an isomorphism (c, c′) → (σ(c), σ(c′)), this shows f(L1) ∼= f(L2), so
L1 ∼= L2, completing the proof.
The preceding has only concerned isomorphism, but concluding results about
back-and-forth equivalence is straightforward:
Theorem 2.3.15. Let L1 and L2 be linear orders on λ. The following are equivalent:
1. L1 ≡∞ω L2
2. g(f(L1)) ≡∞ω g(f(L2))
3. g(f(L1)) and g(f(L2)) are tail-equivalent.
Proof. The maps f and g are absolute, as are back-and-forth equivalence and tail-
equivalence; note this last one is absolute because tails must be of the form [a,∞),
and forcing does not add new elements to a specific set. So let V[G] be a forcing
extension collapsing λ. The truth values of (1), (2), and (3) are invariant between
V and V[G], and because of countability, are equivalent (in V[G]) to the equivalent
expressions where ≡∞ω is replaced by ∼=. But the conditions (1), (2), and (3) are
equivalent in this form by Lemma 2.3.14, completing the proof.
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2.3.4 λ-Borel Completeness
In this section, our goal is to show that if T admits a nonsimple type, then T is
λ-Borel complete for all λ. We have already shown that if T admits a nonsimple
type, then T admits a nonsimple type over ∅. So we have two cases, in line with
our previous work: either this type is nonisolated or atomic. The first case is
straightforward:
Lemma 2.3.16. If T admits a nonsimple nonisolated type over the empty set, then
T is λ-Borel complete for all λ.
Proof. If T admits a nonsimple, nonisolated type over ∅, then by Lemma 2.3.10, T
also admits a faithful nonsimple type p over the empty set. Fix such a p.
Our main concern is to show that given any countable linear order L, there
is a countable model ML |= T such that p(ML)/ ∼ is isomorphic to L as a linear
order. A close examination of the proof will show that this can be made a λ-Borel
function from LO to Mod(T ). Since isomorphism of models implies isomorphism
of the ladders, this establishes a λ-Borel reduction from the λ-Borel complete class
LO, establishing λ-Borel completeness.
So fix a linear order L with universe λ, and let XL = {aα : α ∈ L} be a set
of realizations of p, such that if α < β in L, then [aα] < [aβ] – by faithfulness, this
is a complete specification of tp(XL). Let ML be a constructible model over XL.
Clearly ML has cardinality λ, and this construction is predictable enough to be
made λ-Borel.
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Claim 1. For any L, p(ML)/ ∼ is isomorphic to L as a linear order.
Proof of Claim 1. Define the function f : L → p(ML)/ ∼ by f(α) = [aα]. By
construction of XL, f is injective and order-preserving. So it only remains to show
surjectivity.
Let c ∈ p(ML). Since ML is atomic over XL, tp(c/XL) is either algebraic
or an atomic interval. If c ∈ cl(XL), then for some sequence [aα1 ] < · · · < [aαn ],
c ∈ cl(a). By faithfulness, this means c ∼ aαi for some i, so [c] = f(αi).
Alternately, suppose tp(c/XL) is an atomic interval. Let (a, b) be an XL-
atomic interval in p where a < c < b. By faithfulness, p is 1-nonsimple, so there
is an a′ ∈ clp(a) where a′ > a. Since a ∈ cl(XL), we also have a′ ∈ cl(XL), so by
XL-atomicity of (a, b), we have a
′ ≥ b. Clearly a ∼ a′, so by convexity, a ∼ c. By
the previous paragraph, a ∼ xα for some α, so by transitivity, c ∼ xα as well, so
[c] = f(α).
Therefore f is surjective, so is an isomorphism. Thus p(ML)/ ∼ is isomorphic
to L. (Claim 1)
Now we want to show that for all linear orders L1 and L2 on λ, L1 ≡∞ω L2
if and only if ML1 ≡∞ω ML2 . So let V[G] be any forcing extension in which λ is
countable. The conditions L1 ≡∞ω L2 and ML1 ≡∞ω≡∞ω ML2 are both absolute
and (in the forcing extension) are equivalent to isomorphism, since the structures
are countable. Additionally, the construction L 7→ ML is absolute, so our claim still
holds in V[G]. It is clear that if L1 ∼= L2, then tp(XL1) = tp(XL2), so by uniqueness
of constructible models, ML1 ∼= ML2 . On the other hand, if ML1 ∼= ML2 , then
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p(ML1)/ ∼∼= p(ML2)/ ∼ as linear orders, so by the claim, L1 ∼= L2, as desired.
Lemma 2.3.17. If T admits a nonsimple isolated type over the empty set, then T
is λ-Borel complete for all λ.
Proof. Let λ be an infinite cardinal. Recall that in Theorem 2.3.15, we constructed
λ-Borel reductions g and f from LO to itself such that for all L1 and L2, L1 ≡∞ω L2
if and only if g(f(L1)) ≡∞ω g(f(L2)), if and only if g(f(L1)) and g(f(L2)) are
equivalent on a tail. To simplify notation, we will assume that all linear orders used
in this proof are in the image of g ◦ f , and we will have no particular use for the
preimage of these orders under g ◦ f .
So let p be a nonsimple atomic type, and fix the minimal n where p is n-
nonsimple. For any linear order L on λ, let L∗ = {1, . . . , n} ∪ g(f(L)), where
1 < 2 < · · · < n and n < α for all α ∈ g(f(L)). Let XL be {xα : α ∈ L∗} where
for all α ∈ L∗, xα realizes p and xα > clp({xβ : β < α}). Evidently this condition
completely specifies tp(xα/X<α), so by a standard argument this completely specifies
tp(XL). Let ML be constructible over XL. The function L 7→ ML can be made λ-
Borel, and the isomorphism type ofML is completely determined by tp(XL), which
is completely determined by the isomorphism type of L. By a standard forcing
argument, this can be extended to show that if L1 ≡∞ω L2 then ML1 ≡∞ω ML2 .
The remainder of this proof is to show the converse of this fact.
For any n-element set B fromML, let pB(x) be the nonsimple non-cut p(x)∪
{x > clp(B)}. The primary claim in this proof is to show that for any n-element
set B from p(ML), we recover a tail of g(f(L)) in pB. That is, pB(ML)/ ∼B is
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isomorphic on a tail to g(f(L)). As before, we must divide into two cases, based on
whether p is 1-nonsimple, because of the restrictions in Lemma 2.3.3.
Claim 1. If p is 1-simple, then for any set B ⊆ p(ML) with |B| = n, pB(ML)/ ∼B
is isomorphic on a tail to g(f(L)).
Proof of Claim 1. Let A = {1, . . . , n}; then by construction of ML and the fact
that non-cuts are faithful, pa(ML)/ ∼A is isomorphic to g(f(L)). It is therefore
sufficient to show that for any B, pB(ML)/ ∼B and pA(ML)/ ∼A are isomorphic
on a tail.
So fix an n-element set B from p(ML). Since p is 1-simple, by Lemma 2.3.3,
clp(XL) is a dense linear order without endpoints. Since Pr(XL) is atomic over XL,
p(ML) is clp(XL). So by compactness, there is a finite subset L0 ⊂ L∗ containing
{1, . . . , n} such that AB ⊂ clp ({xα : α ∈ L0}). Let X0 be the tail of XL above XL0 ;
that is, the set of all xα such that for all β ∈ L0, α > β. Since L has no largest
element, X0 is nonempty. We will show it forms a common tail of pA(ML)/ ∼A and
pB(ML)/ ∼B, which is sufficient to prove the claim.
X0 forms a tail of pA(ML)/ ∼A under the function xα 7→ [xα], by the charac-
terization of pA(ML)/ ∼A at the beginning of this proof. As for pB, by construction
of L0, if xα ∈ X0, then xα realizes pB. Each of the xα ∈ X0 is ∼L0-inequivalent
by construction of XL, so must be ∼B-inequivalent as well; it only remains to show
that the set {[x] : x ∈ X0} is right-closed in pB(ML)/ ∼B.
So suppose xα ∈ X0 and c > xα realizes p. By the characterization of
pA(ML)/ ∼A, c ∼A xβ for some β ≥ α. Since c and xβ are both greater than
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or equal to xα, which is above cl
p({xγ : γ < α}) ⊃ clp(AB), we can use the canoni-
cal tail condition to conclude that c ∼B xβ as well. Therefore, [c] ∈ {[x] : x ∈ X0},
so X0 forms a tail of pB(ML)/ ∼B. This completes the proof. (Claim 1)
The difference between the preceding claim and the next is that if n = 1, we
cannot necessarily assume that p(ML) is equal to clp(XL): the latter may not be a
dense linear order, so tp(a/XL) being isolated may not imply it being algebraic.
Claim 2. If p is 1-nonsimple, then for any set B from p(ML) with |B| = n = 1,
pB(ML)/ ∼B is isomorphic on a tail to g(f(L)).
Proof of Claim 2. Let a = x1. As before, we can conclude that pa(ML)/ ∼a is
isomorphic to g(f(L)), and therefore that we need to show for every b ∈ p(ML),
pb(ML)/ ∼b and pa(ML)/ ∼a agree on a tail. So, fix such a b. Since tp(b/XL)
is atomic, either b ∈ cl(XL), or tp(b/XL) is generated by an atomic interval. If
b ∈ cl(XL), then the previous proof applies without change. Therefore, assume
tp(b/XL) is an atomic interval (C,D) where C,D ∈ cl(XL).
Let L0 be a finite subset of L
∗ which contains 1 and such that C,D ∈ cl({xα :
α ∈ L0}). Let X0 be the elements of XL which are above L0. This is a right-closed
subset of g(f(L)), so it forms a tail of pa(ML)/ ∼a; it remains to show it forms a tail
of pb(ML)/ ∼b. As before, the function x 7→ [x] is a well-defined, order-preserving
injection from X0 to pb(ML)/ ∼b. It remains to show surjectivity.
So pick a c from pb(ML) such that for some xα ∈ X0, c > xα. For some
β ≥ α, c ∼a xβ; we want to show c ∼b xβ as well. Since p has a canonical tail, it
is enough to show that xα > cl
p(ab), so suppose not. Then there is an a-definable
66
function f(x) where f(b) ≥ xα. Then f(x) is defined and strictly monotone on the
atomic interval (C,D); we may assume strict increasing. Since xα > cl
p(X0), it
must be that limx→D− f(x) =∞. We will use this limit to prove that (C,D) is not
X0-atomic, yielding a contradiction.
The image of (C,D) under the function f must also be an interval, since f
is continuous and strictly increasing, and so by the argument above, it must be of
the form (E,∞) for some E ∈ clp(X0). By 1-nonsimplicity, there is a E ′ > E in
p which is E-definable; since the interval is right-infinite, E ′ ∈ im(f). But then
f−1(E ′) ∈ (C,D) and is X0-definable, a contradiction of atomicity of (C,D).
(Claim 2)
Having performed these two claims, the result follows immediately. Suppose
ML1 ≡∞ω ML2 . Let V[G] be a forcing extension which collapses λ, so that (in
the extension) ML1 ∼= ML2 . Let f : ML1 → ML2 be an isomorphism, and let b
be f(a), where a = {x1, . . . , xn}. Then f is an isomorphism between the expanded
structures (ML1 , a) and (ML2 , b), so in particular p(a)(ML1)/ ∼a and pb(ML2)/ ∼b
are isomorphic as linear orders.
The former is isomorphic to g(f(L1)). By the claims, the latter is isomorphic
to a tail of g(f(L2)), so by construction of our linear orders, g(f(L1)) ∼= g(f(L2)) (in
V[G]). Thus g(f(L1)) ≡∞ω g(f(L2)) in V[G] and in the ground model, completing
the proof.
Combining this with results from the above, we have proved the main theorem
of the section.
67
Theorem 2.3.18. Let T be a countable o-minimal theory. If T admits a nonsimple
type, then T is λ-Borel complete for all λ.
2.4 Corollaries
Most interesting o-minimal theories admit nonsimple types, and are therefore Borel
complete. Our aim for this section is to establish two broad classes of o-minimal
theories which are λ-Borel complete; these yield very general sufficient conditions
for λ-Borel completeness.
The first such class of such theories is the class of nontrivial theories - those
where it is possible for a point to be definable over a set without being definable over
any single point inside that set. For example, any theory with an infinite definable
group would satisfy this property. We show that any nontrivial o-minimal theory is
λ-Borel complete by using nontriviality to construct a nonsimple type over a finite
set, then appealing to Theorem 2.1.7.
The other broad class is the discretely o-minimal theories, or even those which
have a significant discrete part. Although it was shown in [19] that the discrete
part of an o-minimal theory is completely trivial (in the above sense), the successor
function still provides an interesting (unary) function on that part of the structure
where it is defined, which is enough to construct a nonsimple type and show λ-Borel
completeness.
We remark that these two results, while quite general, do not suggest a char-
acterization of all nonsimple types. Example 2.5.1 and its variations give theories
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which are trivial and completely dense, but still admit nonsimple types.
2.4.1 Nontrivial Theories
Recall that a theory T nontrivial if there is some point b and some set A where
b ∈ cl(A) but b 6∈
⋃
a∈A cl(a). We use exchange and nontriviality to produce a
nonsimple type over finitely many parameters, and therefore conclude with λ-Borel
completeness.
Theorem 2.4.1. If T is a nontrivial o-minimal theory then T admits a nonsimple
type.
Proof. Suppose T is nontrivial. We will produce a nonsimple type p(x) over finitely
many parameters, establishing λ-Borel completeness by Theorem 2.1.7 and Corol-
lary 2.1.6. By nontriviality, there is a set A and b ∈ cl(A) where b 6∈ cl(a) for any
a ∈ A. We may assume A is finite, and that A has minimal cardinality among all
“nontrivial sets.” Enumerate A in an ascending way as a1 < · · · < an, remarking
that n ≥ 2. The set B = {a3, . . . , an} will be the first part of our parameter set.
Then b ∈ clB(a1, a2) but b 6∈ clB(ai) for either i. Let p(x) = tp(a1/B),
q(x) = tp(a2/B), and r(x) = tp(b/B). Each of these types is nonalgebraic. Suppose
(for example) that clpB(a2) is nonempty; then we may replace a2 with some realization
of p(x), bidefinable with a2 over B, without affecting the dependence relation b ∈
cl(a1a2)\(cl(a1)∪cl(a2)). Using this idea and exchange, we may assume the following
cases are exhaustive:
First: One of the types p, q, or r is a nonsimple B-type, in which case the
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theorem is proved.
Second: p = q = r; then p is a 2-nonsimple B-type under whatever function
takes the pair (a1, a2) to b.
Third: p = q and p 6= r. Then there is a B-definable binary function f :
p2 → r taking ascending pairs from p into single elements of r. Then for any a
modeling p, there is a unique extension of r to a Ba-type (or else we’re actually in
the previous case) and the function f(a, y) must be a bijection from the complete
Ba-type p(x) ∪ {x > a} to r. But then the function g : p → p where g(x) is the
unique y > x such that f(x, y) = b is well-defined and nonsimple, so that p(x) is a
complete, nonsimple Bb-type.
Fourth: p, q, and r are all distinct. Let f be such that f(a1, a2) = b. Then
for any c modeling r, the types p and q are completely described over Bc and the
function f(a, y) is a bijection from q to r. So for any c realizing r, we have a bijection
hc : p→ q taking x to the unique y where f(x, y) = c.
Therefore, fix c1 < c2 realizing r. If p or q does not extend uniquely to a
complete Ac1c2-type, then we have a function r
2 → p or r2 → q, and T is λ-Borel
complete by a previous case. But otherwise, p and q are complete over Ac1c2, and
the functions hc1 and hc2 are distinct bijections p → q. Therefore h−1c1 ◦ hc2 is a
nontrivial bijection p→ p, so p is a nonsimple type over Bc1c2.
By Corollary 2.1.6, such a theory admits a nonsimple type. By Theorem 2.1.7,
this implies λ-Borel completeness and more. Note that this implies the λ-Borel




Given an o-minimal theory T , a model M |= T , say a point a ∈ M is non-dense
if a has either an immediate successor or an immediate predecessor (which may
be among ±∞). If T has only finitely many such points, they play no role in the
countable model theory of T ; we can canonically fit a copy of (Q, <) between any
non-dense point and its successor or predecessor, resulting in a theory which is
essentially identical (for our purposes) to T , but which is everywhere dense. Our
theorem for this section is the following:
Theorem 2.4.2. If T is an o-minimal theory with infinitely many non-dense points,
then T admits a nonsimple type.
Proof. We construct a nonsimple type over the empty set. Since there are infinitely
many non-dense points, there is an infinite interval I0 over ∅ which consists entirely
of non-dense points. Therefore, there is a subinterval I of I0 of points which all have
immediate successors and predecessors. Let S(x) denote the immediate successor
function, where it is defined. We will construct a complete type extending I which
is nonsimple under the function x 7→ S(x).
Let I = (a, b), noting a, b ∈ cl(∅). We have several cases:
First: If a has no immediate successor, then define p(x) by
p(x) = {a < x} ∪ {x < c : c > a, c ∈ cl(∅)}
By o-minimality, p(x) is a complete type, and clearly extends I. It may be either
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an atomic interval (if clI(∅) = ∅) or a non-cut (a)+ (if not), but either way, it must
be closed under S. For if not, there is an x realizing p(x) such that S(x) ≥ c for
some c ∈ clI(∅). But then S(x) = c, so S−1(c) is well-defined, in cl(∅), and equal to
x, so that x does not model p after all.
Thus p(x) is complete and nonsimple under the function S.
Second: If b has no immediate predecessor, then define q(x) by
q(x) = {x < b} ∪ {x > c : c < b, c ∈ cl(∅)}
By the same logic as above, q(x) is complete and closed under the function x 7→
S−1(x), so is nonsimple.
Finally: If S(a) and S−1(b) both exist, then define r(x) by
r(x) = {x > Sn(a) : n ∈ ω} ∪ {x < c : c ∈ cl(∅) ∧ c > Sn(a) for all n ∈ ω}
Then r(x) is a complete type over ∅ as before, and is a cut. But as before, if x
realizes r, then S(x) is defined and must still realize r. Thus r is nonsimple.
By Theorem 2.1.7, such a theory must be λ-Borel complete.
2.5 Examples
We begin with several basic example of o-minimal theories. We assume the reader
is aware of classical quantifier elimination results for the theory of real-closed fields
and for ordered divisible abelian groups; if not see [13]. Most of our examples are
definable reducts of an expansion of these theories by constants, so that o-minimality
follows automatically. We have omitted many of the verifications of these examples
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when they seem similar to previous proofs; the interested reader is encouraged to
fill them in as s/he desires.
Example 2.5.1. LetM have universe Q and have a unique unary function f given
by x 7→ x+ 1.
Then S1(T ) has a single element, the atomic interval x = x, and this is 1-
nonsimple and faithful.
Proof. M is o-minimal as a reduct of (Q,+, <). The function x 7→ x + q is an
automorphism ofM for any q ∈ Q, and thus every element has the same 1-type, so
x = x is a complete formula. This atomic interval is 1-nonsimple under the function
f .
To see faithfulness, we will need to see that the following statements are a
complete axiomatization of T , and that the resulting theory has quantifier elimina-
tion:
• < is a dense linear order without endpoints.
• f is a strictly increasing bijection on the universe.
• For all x, x < f(x).
The proof of quantifier elimination of the above axioms is standard; complete-
ness follows from the fact that M satisfies these axioms and embeds into every
model of them.
To see faithfulness, let N be some elementary extension of M. It is enough
to see that if [x1] < · · · < [xn] and z ∈ cl(x), then z ∈ [xi] for some i. For each i,
73
let Qi = {y : ∃n ∈ Z(sn(x) ≤ y < sn+1(x))}. Evidently Qi ⊂ [xi], so Q1 < Q2 <
· · · < Qn. Also, by completeness of the above axioms, the set Q = Q1 ∪ · · · ∪Qn is
a model of T ; by quantifier elimination, Q ≺ N . Since z ∈ cl(x), z ∈ Q, so z ∈ Qi
for some i, so z ∈ [xi].
Example 2.5.2. LetM have universe Q, have a single function f(x) = x+ 1, and
have constant symbols for n ∈ Z.
Then S1(T ) has infinitely many atomic intervals, all dependent on one another
and simple, and two non-cuts, which are independent, nonsimple, and faithful.
The above properties still hold if we only have a single constant symbol.
Proof. The types n < x < n + 1 are atomic – any order-preserving bijection from
(n, n+1) to itself induces an automorphism of the structure, witnessing completeness
of the intervals. They must be simple since all countable dense linear orders are n-
transitive for all n. Of course the non-cuts at ∞ and −∞ are nonsimple under the
function f , and non-cuts are faithful, as desired.
Example 2.5.3. Let M have universe Q, constant symbols for each n ∈ Z, and
unary functions fn for n ∈ Z where fn(x) = x+1 and fn is only defined on [n, n+1).
Then S1(T ) has infinitely many atomic intervals, all dependent on one another
and simple, and two non-cuts, which are independent and simple.
Example 2.5.4. Let M have universe Q, constant symbols for each q ∈ Q, and
unary functions fn for n ∈ Z where fn(x) = x+1 and fn is only defined on [n, n+1).
Then S1(T ) has no atomic intervals, infinitely many independent non-cuts (all
of which have an infinite dependence class), and uncountably many independent
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cuts (all of which have an infinite dependence class). Additionally T has two non-
cuts which are independent from each other and everything else. All these types are
simple.
Example 2.5.5. LetM have universe Q, have a single function f(x) = x+ 1, and
have constant symbols for q ∈ Q.
Then S1(T ) has infinitely many independent non-cuts, each of which has an
infinite dependence class. S1(T ) also has uncountably many cuts, each of which has
an infinite dependence class and is simple. S1(T ) has no atomic intervals.
Additionally, S1(T ) has two independent non-cuts which are nonsimple.
The above properties still hold if we give M symbols for fq(x) = x+ q for all
q ∈ Q.
Example 2.5.6. Let M be (Q, <,+, 0, 1), and let p be the cut corresponding to
any irrational number.
Then the cut p is 2-nonsimple and 1-simple, hence unfaithful. There are no
faithful cuts, but there are nonsimple non-cuts near p.
Proof. Clearly p is 2-nonsimple under the function (x, y) 7→ x+y
2
.
Let N be (R, <,+, 0, 1). Since T = Th(M) has quantifier elimination, M ≺
N . The type p is realized by a single element (the irrational number used to create
p); call it a. If p were 1-nonsimple under some function f , then f(a) would be
a realization of p which is not equal to a, which is impossible. This proves p is
1-simple.
Since every cut is of this form, we have proven the result. The nonsimple
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non-cuts are any non-cut, including those at ∞. The non-cuts at (q)+ and (q)− for
rational q are nonsimple under the function x 7→ x+q
2
.
Example 2.5.7. Let M have underlying set Q1 + Q2, where both Qi are copies of
(Q, <) and Q1 < Q2. Give M symbols for all n in both copies of Z, and a unary
function f(x) where f(x) = x+ 1i, where 1i is the copy of 1 in the Qi containing x.
Let p be the type {m < x < n : m ∈ Zi, n ∈ Zi}.
Then the cut p is 1-nonsimple and faithful, but there are no nonsimple non-
cuts or atomic intervals anywhere. M has infinitely many atomic intervals (two
dependence classes) and two non-cuts (independent of one another).
If we add constants for all rationals, then we have no atomic intervals, many
non-cuts, and uncountably many cuts, but the only nonsimple type is still p.
Example 2.5.8. LetM be an ℵ0-saturated elementary extension of (Q, <,+, 0, 1),
let a be some realization of the non-cut (0)+, and let T be the theory of M with a
symbol for a.
Let π be some irrational number in R, and let p(x) be the type given by
{x > q + na : q ∈ Q<π, n ∈ Z} ∪ {x < q + na : q ∈ Q>π, n ∈ Z}.
Then the cut p is 1-nonsimple yet unfaithful. There are no faithful cuts, but
there are nonsimple non-cuts near p.
Proof. First, by the usual quantifier elimination for the theory of ordered divisible
abelian groups, for any set X, cl(X) = q + ra+ sx, where q, r, s ∈ Q, a is our fixed
infinitesimal, and x ∈ X. In particular this shows p(x) is a complete type and a
cut. Clearly p is closed under the function x 7→ x+ a, witnessing 1-nonsimplicity.
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To see the unfaithfulness, suppose [x] < [y]; we will show [x] < [x+y
2
] < [y].
This follows quickly from the following claim:
Claim 1. Suppose b ∈ clp(x). Then b = x+ ra for some rational r.
Proof of Claim 1. If b ∈ clp(x), then b = q+ra+sx for some rational q, r, s. We will
show q = 0 and s = 1. Since p is fixed under x 7→ x+a and is convex, it is also closed
under x 7→ x − ra, so b − ra = q + sx realizes p. If s = 0 then b = q + ra ∈ cl(∅),
which is not a realization of p, so s 6= 0. Also, sx realizes the (partial) cut π − q,
so x realizes the (partial) cut π−s
q
. But of course x realizes the (partial) cut π, so
π−s
q
= π, so (1 − q)π = s. If q 6= 1, then π is irrational (a contradiction); if q = 1,
then s = (1− q)π = 0, proving the claim. (Claim 1)
Since [y] > [x], y > clp(x), so in particular y > 2ra + x for all rational r.




> ra for all r, so x+y
2
> x+ra




] < [y], as desired.
Example 2.5.9. Let M have universe Q and have a single function f(x, y, z) =
x+ y − z.
Then S1(T ) has a single element, the atomic interval x = x, and this is 1-
simple, 2-nonsimple, and unfaithful.
Proof. T is a definable reduct of the theory of (Q,+, 0, <), so is o-minimal. If a < b
and c < d, then the function x 7→ (x−a) · d−c
b−a preserves f , is a bijection, and takes a
to c and b to d. Thus the formula x = x defines a complete type which is 1-simple.
Visibly this is 2-nonsimple under the function (x, y) 7→ x+ x− y, so the type must
be unfaithful as well.
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Example 2.5.10. Let M have universe Q, a unary function s(x) = x + 1, and a
ternary function f(x, y, z) = x+ y − z.
Then S1(T ) has a single element, the atomic interval x = x, and this is 1-
nonsimple and unfaithful.
Proof. T is a definable reduct of an o-minimal theory, so is o-minimal. For any x
and y in Q, the function z 7→ z + (y − x) is readily seen to be an automorphism of
the structure taking x to y, so x = x is a complete type. It is visibly 1-nonsimple
under the function s. To see the unfaithfulness, we must construct a nonstandard
model, since M has only one Archimedean class.
So let M′ be the expansion of M by a constant symbol for zero. Then M′
is a definable expansion of (Q,+, 0, 1, <), so the theory T ′ of M′ implies that the
definable reduct to s(x) = x+ 1 and f(x, y, z) = x+ y− z is a model of our original
theory T , and this will hold for any model of T ′. So let M′2 be a model of T ′ with
infinite elements x and y such that [x] < [y] in M′2.
Let M2 be the reduct of M′2 to our original language. Since Archimedean
equivalence is finer in a reduct, it is still true that [x] < [y] in M2. The function
z 7→ z + (y − x) is an automorphism of M2 taking x to y and y to 2y − x; thus
[x] < [y] < [2y − x] in M2. Yet 2y − x = f(y, y, x), so is in the closure of {x, y},
witnessing 2-unfaithfulness of the type.
In Chapter 3, we will see that if T is a colored linear order in a finite language,
then either T is λ-Borel complete or ℵ0-categorical. It is natural to ask if the same
is true for o-minimal theories, and the answer is no:
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Example 2.5.11. Let M have universe Q ∪Q
√
2. Give M two unary functions f
and g:
• f has domain [0, 2], and where defined, f(x) = x+ 1.
• g has domain [0, 2], and where defined, g(x) = x+
√
2.
Then T = Th(M) is o-minimal in a finite language, and ∼=T is Borel equivalent
to ∼=2.
Proof. The theory of “ordered divisible abelian groups” is o-minimal, and Q∪Q
√
2
is a model of this theory. If we expand it by constants for 0, 1, 2, and
√
2, it is
still o-minimal, and f and g are definable on this structure. So M is a definable
reduct of this o-minimal structure, so is o-minimal. It remains to show that S1(T )
is uncountable and that it contains no nonsimple types.
First we must show S1(T ) is uncountable. To see this, we first show cl(∅) is
dense in some interval. Toward this end, note that the function h(x) taking x ∈ [0, 1]
to (x+
√
2) mod 1 is definable – h(x) is the unique y ∈ [0, 1] such that x+
√
2 is equal
to y+ 1 or y+ 2. It is a classical fact if r is irrational, the orbits of x 7→ x+ r in S1
are dense in S1, implying our desired result. Then cl(∅)∩ (0, 1) is a countable dense
linear order, so is order-isomorphic to (Q, <). Thus (R, <) has an order-preserving
injection into S1(T ), sending each rational r to the corresponding algebraic type
and sending each irrational r to the corresponding cut.
Second we show that S1(T ) has no nonsimple types. Consider first the intervals
(−∞, 0) and (2 +
√
2,∞). Any order-preserving bijection of either set induces an
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isomorphism of the structure. Thus these intervals are complete types. Additionally,
for any n, (Q, <) is n-transitive, so these intervals must be n-simple. Since this holds
for all n, they are simple types.
For the rest of the types, first consider the theory T where f and g have
unrestricted domain; this theory has an easy quantifier elimination. If h(x1, . . . , xn)
is definable in T , it is also definable in T , so locally h(x1, . . . , xn) is equal to xi + a
for some a ∈ Q + Q
√
2. So suppose p ∈ S1(T ) is nonsimple. Then p must be
1-nonsimple, so some function x 7→ x+ a maps p to p. Yet since p implies 0 ≤ x ≤
2 +
√
2, so p has “finite width;” therefore, after enough applications of x 7→ x + a,
x will no longer satisfy p. This contradiction shows that p cannot be nonsimple, as
desired.
We end this chapter with an annoying open question:
Question 2.5.12. Let T be o-minimal and let p be a type. Is it possible for p to
be nonsimple but 2-simple?
If so, are both cuts and atomic intervals of this form possible?
Similarly, is it possible for p to be 1-nonsimple, 2-faithful, and 3-unfaithful?
My intuition is no for several reasons. First and weakest, by analogy with
colored linear orders, it an old result (see for example [23]) that any 2-transitive
linear order is n-transitive for all n. Since being n-simple corresponds to pn+1 being
complete, which has a straightforward phrasing in terms of automorphisms taking
n + 1-tuples to n + 1-tuples, one might wonder whether his argument generalizes
here. Unfortunately it does not, but the suggestion is there. Second and equally
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unconvincing, the examples simply refuse to present themselves, despite quite a bit
of trying.
Third and finally, by appeal to the trichotomy theorem in [17]. If a type is
1-simple and 2-nonsimple, then the theory interprets a group (interval) near that
type. If a type is 2-simple and 3-nonsimple, then the theory interprets a field (or
rather, a portion of it). Both of these involve parameters, but if we ignore this for
a moment, then either of the binary functions of the field seem to make the type
2-nonsimple, a contradiction. This would revolve around a serious examination of
their proof to identify sources of parameters, but seems promising. It is well outside
the scope of this work, though, so we will not address it further.
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Chapter 3: Colored Linear Orders
In 1973, Matatyahu Rubin published his master’s thesis on the model theory of
complete theories of linear orders, possibly with countably many unary predicates
added. Most prominently, he proved in [24] that such a theory has either finitely
many or continuum-many countable models, up to isomorphism. This was part of
a larger set of results in his master’s thesis, wherein he investigated a huge vari-
ety of model-theoretic properties of such theories, such as the size of type spaces,
finite axiomatizability, and characterizing saturation of models. We continue his
investigation here, examining what we will call colored linear orders.
Definition 3.0.13. Say 0 ≤ κ ≤ ℵ0, and let Lκ be the language {<} ∪ {Pi : i ≤ κ}
where < is a binary relation and each Pi is a unary relation. A colored linear order,
or CLO, is a complete Lκ-theory for some κ making < a linear order.
If T is a CLO (theory) and A |= T , we will also refer to A as a CLO. This will
cause no confusion.
Note that the term “colored linear orders” can be misleading; we allow the
possibility of elements having multiple “colors,” or to have no “colors” at all. A
CLO is merely an expansion of a linear order by up to ℵ0 unary predicates.
We look into the complexity of such theories from two perspectives – the
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Borel complexity of isomorphism for countable models of CLOs, and the number of
models (of any cardinality) up to back-and-forth equivalence. It turns out that there
are essentially five classes of such theories. First is the ℵ0-categorical theories; then
those with finitely many countable models; then those whose complexity corresponds
exactly to ∼=1; then those whose complexity corresponds exactly to ∼=2; then those
with unbounded complexity. With the exception of “finite,” each of these classes
contains exactly one element up to reducibility, and the Borel complexity lines up
exactly with the corresponding count of back-and-forth inequivalent models. This
theorem is finally stated and proved precisely in Theorem 3.3.13. It is worth noting
that these five complexity classes are essentially identical to those appearing for
o-minimal theories, as shown in Chapter 2, and for essentially the same reasons –
a divide on local simplicity or nonsimplicity, then a type-counting argument in the
simple case.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. We begin by highlighting what is the
core of Rubin’s work in [24], since this paper relies heavily on his work there. We
then introduce other background the reader will need, such as notions of sum and
shuffle and Rosenstein’s characterization of ℵ0-categorical linear orders.
In Section 3.2 we re-introduce the notion of self-additive CLOs (approximately
those which cannot be definably divided into proper convex pieces) and show they
are either minimally or maximally complex. In Section 3.3, we show that CLOs can
be definably decomposed into essentially self-additive pieces, and that if any of these
are maximally complicated, so is the whole theory. If not, we characterize back-and-
forth equivalence for such theories as fairly simple, showing a strong dichotomy. We
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then fine-tune this analysis to give the exact cases which a CLO can fall into, and
prove our characterization.
We end with a special case, showing that none of the “middle cases” can
happen if the language is finite. This generalizes a theorem of Schirmann in [26],
where a similar result was shown for complete theories of linear orders.
3.1 Background
For this section we cover several classical topics which are essential to the study of
linear orders, such as convex sums, shuffles, and Rosenstein’s characterization of ℵ0-
categorical linear orders. But first and foremost, we want to highlight the following
“technical lemma” of Rubin, which appears as Corollary 2.3 in [24]:
Lemma 3.1.1. Let A be a CLO, and let B ⊂ A be convex. Let φ(x) be a for-
mula, possibly with parameters from A \B. Then there is a formula φ#(x) with no
parameters where, for all b from B, B |= φ#(b) if and only if A |= φ(b).
This is the reason that CLOs are so nice from a logical perspective. Because
B is convex, the order type of some b ∈ B and some a ∈ A is determined by a and
the fact that b ∈ B; that is, for any b, b′ ∈ B, b < a if and only if b < a′. The rest of
the atoms are unary, so hold in B exactly as they would in A. So by an inductive
argument, we get the above lemma.
This is used to tremendous effect throughout [24], primarily to prove that
given some CLOs A ⊂ B, actually A ≺ B. We will cite numerous lemmas from
[24] which are of this form, and their proofs are all essentially of this form. We do
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not reproduce these arguments here, though we do need to produce one ourselves
for Lemma 3.3.8, so that the reader can get some of the flavor. It is our opinion
that all of our results on CLOs hinge on two points: the ease of constructing models
through sums, and some form of Lemma 3.1.1.
3.1.1 Sums and Shuffles
We now introduce two classical operations, the sum and the shuffle, which go back
at least to Hausdorff. Unlike the situation with o-minimal theories or ℵ0-stable
theories, CLOs lack prime models over sets in general. Consequently we will rely on
these operations to construct new models of our theories.
We first examine the notion of a sum; if (I,<) is a linear order and for each
i, Ai is a CLO in the language L, we can define
∑
iAi in the natural way. It has
universe {(a, i) : a ∈ Ai, i ∈ I}. We say (a, i) < (b, j) if i < j, or if i = j and a < b
in Ai. For any color P in L, we say P (a, i) holds in the sum if P (a) holds in Ai.
This is an extremely well-behaved operation, and the following properties can be
verified immediately (or see [23]):
Proposition 3.1.2. Let (I,<) be a linear order and let (Ai : i ∈ I) be CLOs in the
same language L.











We use the familiar notation A1 + · · ·+An for finite sums. If C ⊂ A is convex,
then A decomposes as a sum B1 + C + B2, where B1 is the set of elements below
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every element of C, and likewise with B2. The following gives one way we will use
sums to construct new models:
Proposition 3.1.3. Suppose Φ(x) is a partial type with no parameters, A is a CLO,
and C = Φ(A) is convex. Decompose A as B1 + C + B2. For any CLO D, define
AD as B1 +D +B2. If C ≡ D, then AD ≡ A and Φ(AD) = D.
Proof. First, add a new predicate P to the language, and let P (a) hold for some
a ∈ A if and only if a ∈ C. Expand D to the new language to let P hold everywhere.
We show that for all tuples b1 and b2 from B1 and B2 respectively, (A, b1, b2) ≡
(AD, b1, b2). This is done by an Ehrenfeucht-Fräısse game argument. So as usual
we may assume the language is finite, fix an n ∈ ω, and describe a strategy for the
second player to win the game of length n. Since C ≡ D, fix a winning strategy for
the second player in the game of length n between C and D. Then for any play,
if the first player plays an element of B1 or B2 from one model, the second player
plays the same element in the other model. If the first player plays within C or D,
the second player follows the winning strategy for those two. This is well-defined
and clearly preserves colors and < within components. Since the components are
convex and we stay within them, this preserves < generally, so proves the result.
That A ≡ AD follows immediately. To see that Φ(AD) = D, first note that
A |= ∀x(P (x) → φ(x)) for all φ ∈ Φ, so D ⊂ Φ(AD). On other hand, for any
b ∈ A \ C, there is a φ ∈ Φ where A |= ¬φ(b). Since (A, b) ≡ (AD, b), AD |= ¬φ(b),
so Φ(AD) ⊂ D, proving the proposition.
Next we define the shuffle. To do this, fix a natural number n, and form a
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countable structure Dn in the language Ln = {<,P1, . . . , Pn} satisfying the following
axioms:
• < is a linear order which is dense and without endpoints.
• The Pi are disjoint, dense, codense, and exhaustive.
It is easy to see that these axioms are consistent, complete, and ℵ0-categorical,
so Dn is defined up to isomorphism. Now for any language L and any CLOs
A1, . . . , An, we form the shuffle σ(A1, . . . , An) as follows. For each i ∈ Dn, de-
fine Di as Aj if and only if Pj(i) holds. Then σ(A1, . . . , An) is the sum
∑
iDi. The
following facts are easily verified:
Proposition 3.1.4. Let A1, . . . , An be countable CLOs in the same language L.
Then all the following hold:
1. If τ is a permutation of {1, . . . , n}, then σ(A1, . . . , An) ∼= σ(Aτ(1), . . . , Aτ(n)).
2. If for all i, Ai ≡ Bi, then σ(A1, . . . , An) ≡ σ(B1, . . . , Bn).
3. If for all i, Ai ∼= Bi, then σ(A1, . . . , An) ∼= σ(B1, . . . , Bn).
While the shuffle may seem somewhat arbitrary, it is important in Rosen-
stein’s characterization of ℵ0-categorical CLOs, and will come up in a natural way
in Section 3.2.
3.1.2 ℵ0-categorical Theories
By convention, we will refer to a structure (of any size) as ℵ0-categorical if and only if
its complete theory has a unique countable model up to isomorphism. In particular,
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following [22], we will consider finite structures (and their complete theories) to be
ℵ0-categorical.
In Section 3.3, we will make important use of Rosenstein’s characterization of
ℵ0-categorical linear orders in [22], which was extended to CLOs by Mwesigye and
Truss in [16]. One begins by defining several classes, which we call Mn.
• M0 is the set of all one-point CLOs; the colors can be arbitrary.
• Mn+1 is the smallest class of CLOs such that all the following are satisfied:
– If A ∈Mn, then A ∈Mn+1.
– If A,B ∈Mn, then A+B ∈Mn+1.
– If A1, . . . , Ak ∈Mn, then σ(A1, . . . , Ak) ∈Mn+1.




Theorem 3.1.5 (Rosenstein; Mwesigye, Truss). Let T be a CLO. Then T is ℵ0-
categorical if and only if T = Th(A) for some A ∈M.
Note that the above makes sense and is true even if the language is infinite,
and we will take advantage of that. However, this “generalization” is almost vacuous
– if a CLO is ℵ0-categorical, only finitely many of its colors are inequivalent.
We can also define a rank: if A is an ℵ0-categorical CLO, let r(A) be the least
n where there is some B ∈ Mn such that A ≡ B. This turns out to be a useful
inductive tool, allowing us to prove all the following facts:
88
Proposition 3.1.6. Let A be a CLO in a language L.
1. If A is ℵ0-categorical, then every convex subset B ⊂ A is also ℵ0-categorical.
Indeed, r(B) ≤ 2 · r(A) + 1.
If L is finite, then we also get the following:
2. For any n ∈ ω, there are only finitely many ℵ0-categorical CLOs in L of rank
n.
3. For any ℵ0-categorical A, there are only finitely many convex subsets of A, up
to back-and-forth equivalence. This bound is uniform in r(A).
Proof. (1) First, assume A is countable; we will generalize in a moment. We show
this by induction on rank. It is trivially true for r(A) = 0. So let r(A) = n+1. Then
either A = B1 +B2 for some Bi ∈Mn, or A = σ(B1, . . . , Bk) for some Bi ∈Mn. In
the first (sum) case, if C ⊂ B1 +B2 is convex, then C = (B1∩C) + (B2∩C), where
each Bi∩C is a convex subset of the Bi. By induction, r(Bi∩C) ≤ r(Bi)+1 ≤ n+1,
so C is the sum of two CLOs with rank at most n+1, so r(C) ≤ n+2 ≤ 2(n+1)+1,
as desired.
In the other (shuffle) case, if C ⊂ σ(B1, . . . , Bk) is convex, then C is either
Bi ∩ C for some i, or (Bi1 ∩ C) + σ(B1, . . . , Bk) + (Bi2 ∩ C), where either of the
Bij could be empty. This is because the left “edge” of C either slips exactly be-
tween Bi components or cuts into one (corresponding to Bi1 being empty or some
Bi, respectively). Similarly with the right “edge.” If these cut into the same Bi
component, there is no shuffle and C is a convex subset of Bi, so has rank at most
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2 · r(Bi) + 1 ≤ 2n+ 1. If they cut into different components, there is an isomorphic
copy of the shuffle between the Bi. The shuffle has rank n + 1, while each of the
sides has at most 2n + 1, so the sum has rank at most 2n + 3 = 2(n + 1) + 1, as
desired.
For the case when A may be uncountable, let C ⊂ A be convex, and let (A,C)
be the structure with an unary predicate for C. Let (A0, C0) ≺ (A,C) be countable,
noting that C ≡ C0, A ≡ A0, and C0 is a convex subset of A0. Then the preceding
special case applies to (A0, C0), and by elementary equivalence, the result for A0
and C0 implies it for A and C, as desired.
(2) If there are k distinct unary predicates in L, there are 2k one-point CLOs,
so there are 2k elements ofM0. IfMn has m elements, thenMn+1 has m elements







elements as shuffles from
Mn. So Mn+1 is finite, as desired.
(3) If B is a convex subset of some A with r(A) ≤ n, then r(B) ≤ 2n + 1 by
(1). By (2), there is a finite number of ℵ0-categorical CLOs of rank at most 2n+ 1,
and this depends only on n.
Finally, we include Corollary 5.11 of [24]:
Theorem 3.1.7 (Rubin). If T is a CLO in a finite language and S1(T ) is finite,
then T is finitely axiomatizable.
In particular, if T is ℵ0-categorical in a finite language, then T is finitely
axiomatizable. This special case can be proven by induction, showing that if A ∈
Mn, then Th(A) is finitely axiomatizable. The proof of Rubin’s theorem above
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requires a characterization of those CLOs which have S1(T ) finite, which has a
similar induction construction (in addition to the above rules, insist that if A ∈Mn,
then Z × A ∈Mn+1); see Theorem 5.9 of [24] for the details.
3.2 Self-Additive Linear Orders
The crux of the characterization of CLOs is a clever definition due to Rubin –
the notion of self-additivity. We summarize their basic properties, following from
Theorem 3.2 and Lemma 3.4 in [24]:
Theorem / Definition 3.2.1. Let A be a CLO with more than one point. The
following properties are equivalent:
• The only ∅-definable convex subsets of A are ∅ and A.




If A satisfies either of these properties, call A self-additive.
For example, each of (Z,≤), (Q, <), and (R, <,Q) are self-additive, but neither
(N, <) nor (Z + 1 + Z, <) is. Self-additive structures are extremely useful for us
because we can easily construct models using the sum operation – property (2)
implies that if T is self-additive, then any sum of models of T is again a model of
T . They also have another important property, namely, a nice condensation on the
models.
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Definition 3.2.2. Let A be a self-additive CLO, and let a and b be from A. Say
a ∼ b if there is a formula φ(x, a) where φ(A, a) is convex, bounded, and contains
both a and b.
The fact that∼ is an equivalence relation is not obvious; indeed both symmetry
and transitivity require a signficant argument which we do not reproduce here. That
∼ is an equivalence relation is a theorem of Rubin in [24], but is spelled out more
plainly in Theorem 13.99 of [23].
Note that we consider a set bounded if there are elements strictly above and
strictly below the entire set. Since self-additive orders cannot have first or last
elements, this is equivalent to any other reasonable definition.
The following is the main way we will show complexity of CLOs:
Lemma 3.2.3. Suppose A is a self-additive CLO, T = Th(A), and p ∈ S1(T ) is
such that there is exactly one ∼-class in A containing a realization of p. Then T is
λ-Borel complete for all λ.
Proof. Let A0 ≺ A be countable and contain a realization of p. If a, b ∈ A0, then
a ∼ b in A0 if and only if a ∼ b in A, so A0 still satisfies the hypotheses of the
theorem. This is to say, we may assume A is countable, and in fact that A has
universe ω. Fix an infinite cardinal λ and a canonical bijection λ× ω → λ. We aim
to show that (LOλ,≡∞ω) ≤λB (Modλ(T ),≡∞ω); by Theorem 1.2.20, this shows that
T is λ-Borel complete.
For any linear order (I,<) with universe λ, let AI =
∑
i∈I A which has universe
λ×ω; under the bijection we may assume AI has universe λ. Let (J,<) be another
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linear order with universe λ, and let AJ be formed like AI . Let V[G] be a forcing
extension in which λ is countable, so that I, J , AI , and AJ are all countable in
V[G]. Then (I,<) ≡∞ω (J,<) if and only if (I,<) ∼= (J,<) in V[G], and likewise
with AI and AJ . This is all to say we may work solely in the countable case, with
isomorphism.
Now clearly if I ∼= J , then AI ∼= AJ . On the other hand, consider the set of
∼-classes EI = {a/∼: AI |= p(a)}. These are naturally ordered by <, and if a ∼ b in
AI , then they come from the same Ai, and are equivalent in AI if and only if they’re
equivalent in Ai. Since each Ai contains exactly one ∼-class containing a realization
of p, EI has order type (I,<). Clearly if AI ∼= AJ , then (EI , <) ∼= (EJ , <), so I ∼= J ,
completing the proof.
For example, this shows that Th(Z, <) is λ-Borel complete for all λ, since
(Z, <) has a unique ∼-class. But it can be used much more generally than that. We
borrow Lemma 6.1 of [24]:
Lemma 3.2.4 (Rubin). Let A ≡ B be self-additive, T = Th(A). Let b ∈ B be
arbitrary. Then the canonical embedding from A + (b/∼) + A to A + B + A is
elementary.
Lemma 3.2.5. Let T be a theory of a self-additive CLO such that S1(T ) is infinite.
Then T is λ-Borel complete for all λ.
Proof. Let p ∈ S1(T ) be nonisolated. Let A,B |= T be countable such that A omits
p and B realizes p at b. Let B0 = b/∼ as computed in B, and let C = A+B0+A. By
Lemma 3.2.4, C ≺ A+B +A is elementary. Since A,B |= T and T is self-additive,
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A+B+A |= T , so C |= T . Also, both embeddings A→ A+B+A are elementary,
so in particular, no element of A is ∼-equivalent to any element of B0. Similarly,
since B ≺ A + B + A and every element of B0 is ∼-equivalent in B, they are still
∼-equivalent in A+B + A, and thus in C. Finally, c ∈ C realizes the same type it
does in A + B + A, and thus C contains a unique ∼-class containing a realization
of p. So C and T satisfy the hypotheses of Lemma 3.2.3, so T is λ-Borel complete
for all λ.
Of course we cannot say the same when S1(T ) is finite – (Q, <) is ℵ0-categorical
and thus as far from Borel complete as one could be. Our aim is to show that these
are the only two cases which can occur, but we need to move slightly beyond the
self-additive case to do so. We borrow Lemma 5.4 of [24]:
Lemma 3.2.6 (Rubin). Let T be self-additive with S1(T ) finite. If A |= T and
a ∈ A, let Ta = Th(a/∼). Then |S1(Ta)| ≤ |S1(T )|. Also, one of the following
alternatives holds:
1. For every a ∈ A, (a/∼) ≺ A.
2. For every a ∈ A, the set (a/∼) is definable over a. There is no first or last
element in the quotient order A/∼, and if a/∼< b/∼ and p ∈ S1(T ), there is
a c realizing p where a/∼< c/∼< b/∼.
With this lemma in hand, we can finish our work with self-additive structures:
Lemma 3.2.7. Let T be a theory of a self-additive CLO such that S1(T ) is finite.
Then either T is ℵ0-categorical or T is λ-Borel complete for all λ.
94
Proof. Let n = |S1(T )|; we go by induction on n, beginning with n = 1. If n = 1
then every element has the same type, and thus the same color, so essentially T is
the theory of a linear order. If T says the order has a first element, every element
is first, so T is the theory of a singleton, so is ℵ0-categorical (and indeed totally
categorical); the same happens with a last element. Assume this does not happen,
so there is no first or last element. If some element has a unique successor, they all
do, and their successors have predecessors, so everything does. This is known to be
an axiomatization of (Z, <), which (after expanded to an L-structure) has a unique
∼-class, so is λ-Borel complete for all λ by Lemma 3.2.3. Now assume these do not
happen, so no element has an immediate successor or predecessor and there are no
maximal or minimal elements. This is known to be an axiomatization of (Q, <),
which is ℵ0-categorical, completing the proof of the base case.
We move on to the step, where n ≥ 2. There are several cases.
Case: T is not self-additive.
Let φ(x) be a formula with parameters such that (according to T ), the real-
izations of φ form a nonempty proper initial segment of the model. Let A |= T , let
T1 = Th(φ(A)), and let T2 = Th(¬φ(A)). Note that T1 and T2 depend only on T ,
not on A. If both are ℵ0-categorical, so is T , by Proposition 3.1.5. On the other
hand, given any model A |= T and B |= T1, we can construct a structure AB where
we replace φ(A) with B. By Proposition 3.1.3, AB |= T and φ(AB) = B. Evidently
this gives a λ-Borel reduction Mod(T1) ≤λB Mod(T ), so if T1 is λ-Borel complete,
so is T . The same goes for T2. Since |S1(T )| = |S1(T1)| + |S1(T2)|, the inductive
hypothesis applies to both Ti. Thus, either both Ti are ℵ0-categorical or one of them
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is λ-Borel complete for all λ. So the lemma holds for T .
Case: T is self-additive and case (1) of Lemma 3.2.6 applies.
Let A |= T , let a ∈ A be arbitrary, and let B = a/∼. Then B ≺ A, so B |= T ,
so T has a model with a single ∼-class. Then Lemma 3.2.3 applies, so T is λ-Borel
complete for all λ.
Case: T is self-additive and case (2) of Lemma 3.2.6 applies.
Let A |= T be arbitrary. Each ∼-class is an L-structure on its own, and the
theory of a/∼ is determined by tp(a). So there are k ≤ n ∼-classes up to elementary
equivalence; enumerate their theories as T1, . . . , Tk. To simplify notation, add k
unary predicates U1, . . . , Uk to the language, and expand T to the new language by
saying Ui(a) holds if and only if a/∼|= Ti. Since this is a definable expansion, this
does not change the size of the type space, and T satisfies the lemma if and only if
its expansion does.
Then T states precisely that each maximal convex piece of Ui is a model of
Ti, and between any two “convex pieces” and for any i ≤ k, there is a model of Ti
as a maximal convex piece of Ui. It states that the Ui are disjoint and exhaustive.
Fix particular countable models Ai |= Ti, and for any M fitting the preceding
description, form the L-structure A by replacing each maximal convex piece of any
Ui with the L-structure Ai. This can be done, and by Proposition 3.1.2, M ≡ AM .
However, given M and N fitting the description, AM ∼= AN by Proposition 3.1.4, so
the preceding description is a complete theory, so must completely axiomatize T .
Next, see that
∑
i |S1(Ti)| ≤ |S1(T )|. For if a and b come from different Ui,
they have different types in T . And since the ∼-class of an element is formula-
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definable with that element, if a and b come from the same Ui but have different
types in that structure, they have different types in T . Therefore, if k ≥ 2, then
|S1(Ti)| < |S1(T )| for all i, so the inductive hypothesis applies to each of them. If
each is ℵ0-categorical, so is T by Proposition 3.1.5 – T is the shuffle of the Ti. If
some Ti is λ-Borel complete, then so is T , as follows. Let M |= T be countable and
fixed. For any A |= Ti of size λ, let MA be formed by replacing each convex model
of Ti with A. Then |MA| = λ, and given a B |= Ti also of size λ, form MB in the
same way. If MA ∼= MB, this isomorphism preserves maximal convex pieces of Ui,
so A ∼= B. With this in mind, let V[G] collapse λ, so A ≡∞ω B if and only if A ∼= B
in V[G], if and only if MA ∼= MB in V[G], if and only if MA ≡∞ω MB. This shows
Modλ(Ti) ≤λB Modλ(T ), so T is also λ-Borel complete.
The only remaining case is when k = 1, so T is a shuffle of T1. If T1 is self-
additive, then each ∼-class of any A |= T is an elementary substructure of A, so
T1 = T and T admits a model with a single ∼-class. However, since the ∼-class of
any element is definable, T would then imply that every model has only one ∼-class,
contradicting what we already know about T . So T1 is not self-additive. Then a
previous case applies to T1, so T1 is either ℵ0-categorical or is λ-Borel complete for
all λ. In either case, T follows T1 by the logic in the previous paragraph, completing
the proof.
While we do not care about orders with finitely many types for themselves,
we do recover the following theorem which is crucial to us:
Theorem 3.2.8. Let T be self-additive. Then either T is ℵ0-categorical or is λ-Borel
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complete for all λ.
3.3 The General Proof
Finally we consider the general case, where we break up arbitrary CLOs into what
are essentially self-additive pieces. The crucial definition is the following:
Definition 3.3.1. Let T be a CLO. A convex type Φ(x), always in one variable, is
a maximal consistent collection of convex formulas over ∅. The space IT(T ) is the
set of all convex types.
We may give IT(T ) the usual formula topology, wherein it is compact, Haus-
dorff, second countable, and totally disconnected as usual. However, convex types
are naturally ordered by < as follows: say Φ < Ψ if there are formulas φ ∈ Φ and
ψ ∈ Ψ where every realization of φ is strictly below every realization of Ψ (according
to T ). It is immediate that if Φ 6= Ψ, then either Φ < Ψ or Ψ < Φ, and not both.
This induces the same topology as before.
For our purposes, say an L-structure A is sufficiently saturated if it is ℵ0-
saturated, and if a, b ∈ A realize the same type, there is an automorphism of A
taking a to b; we will never need a larger monster model than this. Every complete
theory admits such a model, although there will not be a countable such unless the
theory is small. Sufficiently saturated CLOs are “locally self-additive:”
Lemma 3.3.2. Let T be a CLO, and let S |= T be sufficiently saturated. Then
for all Φ ∈ IT(T ), the set Φ(S) of realizations of Φ in S is either a singleton or
self-additive as an L-structure.
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Proof. Suppose not. Then there is a formula φ(x) whose realizations are initial in
Φ(S), and where there is are points a, b ∈ Φ(S) where Φ(S) |= φ(a) ∧ ¬φ(b). Let
p = tp(b) as formed in the whole of S. Then the type p(x) ∪ {x < a} must be
consistent; otherwise there would be some ψ(x) ∈ p(x) where a lies strictly below
the convex definable set ∃y (y ≤ x ∧ ψ(y)) which includes b, and therefore a and b
realizes different convex types. By ℵ0-saturation of S, there is c ∈ S which realizes
p and has c < a. Clearly Φ(S) |= φ(c). But then there is an automorphism σ of S
where σ(a) = c. But σ preserves Φ, so is an automorphism of Φ(S) which takes b
to c, so by elementarily, Φ(S) |= ¬φ(c), a contradiction.
The theory of Φ(S) turns out to depend only on T , not on choice of sufficiently
saturated model:
Lemma 3.3.3. Let S1 and S2 be sufficiently saturated models of a CLO T . For any
Φ ∈ IT(T ), the L-structures Φ(S1) and Φ(S2) are back-and-forth equivalent, and
thus elementarily equivalent.
Let TΦ be the theory of Φ(S) for any sufficiently saturated S |= T .
Proof. Our claim is that if a ∈ Φ(S1)n and b ∈ Φ(S2)n have (S1, a) ≡ (S2, b), and if
a ∈ Φ(S1) is arbitrary, there is a b ∈ Phi(S2) where (S1, aa) ≡ (S2, bb). This implies
that aa and bb have the same atomic type in the substructures, so together with the
opposite (which follows from symmetry) gives the result.
So fix such tuples a, b, and a. Then p(x, x) = tp(a, a) (evaluated in S1) is
realized and thus consistent with T . Therefore it is realized in S2 by some pair c, c.
But then tp(c) = tp(a) = tp(b), so there is an automorphism σ of S2 taking c to b;
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let b = σ(c). Clearly tp(aa) = tp(cc) = tp(bb), and b ∈ Φ(S2) since c is, so b satisfies
the conditions and proves the result.
Therefore Φ(S1) ≡ Φ(S2), so we may define the notation TΦ to be the complete
L-theory of Φ(S) for any sufficiently saturated S |= T . We can now declare our
fundamental dichotomy:
Definition 3.3.4. Let T be a CLO. Say T is locally simple if for all Φ ∈ IT(T ), TΦ
is ℵ0-categorical. Otherwise say T is locally nonsimple.
Theorem 3.3.5. If T is a locally nonsimple CLO, T is λ-Borel complete for all λ.
Proof. Let S |= T be sufficiently saturated, and let Φ ∈ IT(T ) be such that TΦ is not
ℵ0-categorical. Let A ≺ S be countable such that Φ(A) ≺ Φ(S). Then Φ(A) |= TΦ,
which is a self-additive CLO which is λ-Borel complete for all λ by Theorem 3.2.8.
Furthermore, TΦ ≤λB T as follows. If B ∈ Modλ(TΦ), construct AB by replacing
Φ(A) by B; then A ≡ AB and Φ(AB) = B by Proposition 3.1.3, so in particular
AB ∈ Modλ(T ). Clearly B ∼= B′ if and only if AB ∼= AB′ , so by using that fact in
some V[G] which collapses λ, B ≡∞ω B′ if and only if AB ≡∞ω AB′ , completing the
proof.
Since the global behavior of a CLO is determined essentially by the structure
of IT(T ), if there is also local simplicity, there isn’t much behavior left. Thus, locally
simple CLOs turn out to admit a nice characterization. We borrow Lemma 2.7(1)
of [24]: if B is a CLO, A is any subset of B, and C is the convex hull of A in B,
then A ≺ C. The following is the core lemma for understanding this case:
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Lemma 3.3.6. Let T be locally simple and Φ ∈ IT(T ). Then there is a (minimal)
natural number nΦ and a set {T iΦ : 1 ≤ i ≤ nΦ} of distinct ℵ0-categorical L-theories
where for all A |= T , there is an i where Φ(A) |= T iΦ.
Against model-theoretic convention, we include the “theory of the empty set”
in the list, where we say ∅ |= ∀x(x 6= x), in case A omits Φ.
Further, nΦ = 1 if and only if Φ is isolated in IT(T ).
Proof. Let A |= T . Then Φ(A) ⊂ Φ(S) for any sufficiently saturated S |= T where
A ≺ S. Let C be the convex hull of Φ(A) in Φ(S); then A ≺ C, so they have
the same theory. Also, Φ(C) is a convex subset of an ℵ0-categorical CLO, so is ℵ0-
categorical by Proposition 3.1.6. So A is ℵ0-categorical. Also by Proposition 3.1.6,
there are only finitely many pairwise inequivalent convex subsets of Φ(S), and this
bound depends only on TΦ. So the main text of the lemma is proven.
If Φ is nonisolated, there is a model omitting it and another realizing it, so
nΦ ≥ 2. If Φ is isolated by some formula φ, then for every sentence σ of L, the
sentence “σ holds on Φ” is equivalent to “the relativization of σ to φ is true,” which
is a single L-sentence and thus decided by T . So nΦ = 1.
This allows us to give a simple characterization of back-and-forth equivalence
for locally simple CLOs:
Lemma 3.3.7. Let T be a locally simple CLO, and A,B |= T . The following are
equivalent:
1. A ≡∞ω B
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2. For all Φ ∈ IT(T ), Φ(A) ≡∞ω Φ(B)
3. For all Φ ∈ IT(T ), Φ(A) ≡ Φ(B).
The equivalence of (1) and (2) does not require local simplicity. If A and B
are countable, (1) is equivalent to A ∼= B, and likewise with (2).
Proof. Assuming (1), we can get (2) by playing the back-and-forth game within any
particular Φ; we can reverse this step by patching the various solutions to the Φ
together, and making sure we always match choice of interval type. Assuming (2)
we get (3) immediately, since elementary equivalence is just ≡ωω. The nontrivial
step is to show that (3) implies (2), which follows from Lemma 3.3.6. For if Φ(A) |=
T iΦ for some i, then Φ(B) |= T iΦ, and since T iΦ is ℵ0-categorical, all of its models
are back-and-forth equivalent. The equivalence of back-and-forth equivalence with
isomorphism when the structures are countable is standard and follows from Zorn’s
lemma.
It only remains to give an exhaustive list of the behaviors that a CLO can
exhibit, both in terms of I∞ω(T ) and of the Borel complexity of ∼=T . We will use
the following lemma to construct many models, to the extent that the type space
allows it. Approximately, we would like to choose to omit or realize whatever types
we like. The problem is that if we omit too many, we don’t have enough content
left over to have a model. This turns out to be the only obstruction:
Lemma 3.3.8. Suppose A ⊂ C ⊂ B, that A,B |= T , and that A ≺ B. Suppose also




. Then C ≺ B as
well.
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Proof. Let φ(x, y) be a formula, c a tuple from C, and b an element from B where
B |= φ(c, b). It’s enough to show there is a c ∈ C where B |= φ(c, c). By the
particular construction of C, either b ∈ C or there is a convex formula ψ(y) where
B |= ψ(b), and where no element of c realizes ψ. By Lemma 3.1.1, there is a formula
φ#(y) where for all b′ realizing ψ, ψ(B) |= φ#(b′) if and only if B |= φ(c, b′). Since
ψ is itself definable, there is a formula φ∗(y) where B |= ∀y (φ∗(y)↔ φ(c, y)). Of
course B |= φ∗(b), and since A ≺ B, there is an a ∈ A where B |= φ∗(a). Since
A ⊂ C, this a is the element we were looking for, which completes the proof.
We can now give individual cases:
Proposition 3.3.9. If T is locally simple and IT(T ) is finite, T is ℵ0-categorical
and I∞ω(T ) = 1.
Proof. Since IT(T ) is finite, every Φ ∈ IT(T ) is isolated. Thus nΦ = 1 for all Φ, so
every A,B |= T are back-and-forth equivalent by Lemma 3.3.7. If A and B are also
countable, they are isomorphic as well.
Proposition 3.3.10. If T is locally simple and IT(T ) is infinite but with only finitely
many nonisolated types, there is a natural number n ≥ 3 where ∼=T is (n,=) and
I∞ω(T ) = n.
Proof. Let Φ1, . . . ,Φk ∈ IT(T ) be the nonisolated convex types, and let m be the
product of the nΦi . For any A |= T , let tA be (Th(Φi(A)) : i ≤ k). If A,B |= T , then
A ≡∞ω B if and only if tA = tB. Further, there are at most m possible sequences
tA, so T has at most m countable models up to isomorphism; call the exact count
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n. That n ≥ 2 comes the fact that some type is nonisolated; that n ≥ 3 comes from
the fact that T is a complete first-order theory.
Clearly I∞ω(T ) ≥ n. That I∞ω(T ) ≤ n comes as follows; if A |= T is arbitrary,
let A0 ≺ A be countable and have Φ(A0) ≺ Φ(A) for all Φ ∈ IT(T ). Then A ≡∞ω A0.
And for any two models A,B |= T , A ≡∞ω B if and only if A0 ≡∞ω B0, if and
only if A0 ∼= B0. Since there are n isomorphism types of countable models of T ,
I∞ω(T ) ≤ n, completing the proof.
Proposition 3.3.11. If T is locally simple and IT(T ) is countable but with infinitely
many nonisolated types, then ∼=T is ∼=1 and I∞ω(T ) = i1.
Proof. We first show ∼=T≤B∼=1 by showing a Borel reduction from Modω(T ) to (ωω,=
). For each Φ, fix an indexing of {T iΦ : 1 ≤ i ≤ nΦ}. Also fix an indexing {Φn :
n ∈ ω} of IT(T ). Then for any model M |= T , let sM ∈ ωω take n ∈ ω to the
unique i where Φn(A) |= T iΦ. Certainly for any M,N |= T , M ≡∞ω N if and only
if sM = sN , so ∼=T≤B∼=1. Since this construction makes sense for any models of T ,
this also shows I∞ω(T ) ≤ i1.
For the other direction, we show ∼=1≤B∼=T by giving a Borel reduction from
(2ω,=) to Modω(T ). So let A |= T be some model omitting every nonisolated type
in IT(T ), and let B  A realize every type in IT(T ). For η ∈ 2ω, let Cη omit
Φn ∈ IT(T ) if and only if η(n) = 0. This is done by use of Lemma 3.3.8, so that
Cη is just the elements of B which are not in
⋃
{Φ(B) : η(n) = 0}. Certainly this
can be made Borel and Cη ∼= Cν if and only if η = ν. So ∼=1≤B∼=T . Since these
models is countable and pairwise nonisomorphic, they are also pairwise back-and-
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forth inequivalent. So I∞ω(T ) ≥ i1, completing the proof.
Proposition 3.3.12. If T is locally simple and IT(T ) is uncountable, then ∼=T is
∼=2 and I∞ω = i2.
Proof. We first show that ∼=T≤B∼=2 by showing a Borel reduction from Modω(T )
to ((X)ω, E), where X is the set of all possible L-theories and two functions are
equivalent if and only if their images are equal as sets. Since X is a standard Borel
space, (X,E) ∼
B
∼=2. So let M ∈ Modω(T ), and for each n ∈ ω, let ΦMn be the convex
type of n in M . Then let TMn be the theory of Φ
M
n (M), and define our function by
M 7→ (TMn : n ∈ ω). By Lemma 3.3.7, countable models M,N |= T have M ∼= N if
and only if they realize the same convex types (necessarily a countable set), and for
each realized type Φ, Φ(M) ≡ Φ(N). This is equivalent to the sets {TMn : n ∈ ω}
and {TNn : n ∈ ω} being equal.
The back-and-forth version of this argument is less delicate. Two models
M,N |= T (of any size) are back-and-forth equivalent if and only if, for all Φ ∈
IT(T ), Φ(M) ≡ Φ(N). Since IT(T ) is uncountable, |IT(T )| = i1, so I∞ω(T ) ≤
ωi1 = i2.
For the reverse, we again use Lemma 3.3.8. Fix a countable model M |= T and
some model S |= T realizing every convex type. Let X be the set of convex types
omitted by M ; since IT(T ) is uncountable and M is countable, X is an uncountable
standard Borel space using the usual topology. For any set K ⊂ IT(T ), let MK be
S \
⋃
Φ∈X\K Φ(S). If K1 6= K2, MK1 and MK2 realize different types, so are pairwise
inequivalent. Thus I∞ω(T ) ≥ i2.
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For the countable version of this argument, we need to be slightly more careful.
We restrict ourselves to countable K, so that MK realizes only countably many
types. We also need Φ(S) to be countable for each S, which can be guaranteed by
simply replacing each Φ(S) with a countable elementary substructure. But then we
have a Borel function from (Xω, E) to (Modω(T ),∼=), where we take f : ω → X to
Mim(f). Certainly Mim(f) ∼= Mim(g) if and only if im(f) = im(g), if and only if fEg.
So ∼=2≤B∼=T , as desired.
We summarize our findings in the following compilation theorem:
Theorem 3.3.13. Let T be a CLO. If T is locally nonsimple, T is λ-Borel complete
for all λ. Otherwise T is locally simple and exactly one of the following happens:
1. T is ℵ0-categorical.
2. There is some n with 3 ≤ n < ω where ∼=T is (n,=) and I∞ω(T ) = n.
3. ∼=T∼B∼=1 and I∞ω(T ) = i1.
4. ∼=T∼B∼=2 and I∞ω(T ) = i2.
All five cases are possible, including every value of n with 3 ≤ n < ω.
We end this section with a nice corollary of our findings, a special case when
the language is finite and the dichotomy is very sharp. This result generalizes a
result of Schirmann in [26], where a countable version of the same theorem was
proven for linear orders without any colors.
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Corollary 3.3.14. If T is a CLO in a finite language L, then either T is ℵ0-
categorical or is λ-Borel complete for all λ.
Proof. If T is locally nonsimple, or if IT(T ) is finite, the corollary follows from
Theorem 3.3.13. So suppose, by way of contradiction, that there is a nonisolated
Φ ∈ IT(T ). Let (Φn : n ∈ ω) be a sequence from IT(T ) limiting to Φ. Without loss
of generality, we assume Φn < Φn+1 for all n. Since L is finite, every ℵ0-categorical
CLO in L is finitely axiomatizable by Theorem 3.1.7, and there are only finitely many
such theories of any particular rank by Theorem 3.1.5. Thus, for every n, there is an
L-formula σ(x, y) stating “x < y and [x, y] is not an ℵ0-categorical CLO of rank at
most n.” For a moment, suppose the partial type Γ(x, y) = σ(x, y)∪Φ(x)∪Φ(y) is
consistent. Then any sufficiently saturated S |= T realizes it at some pair [a, b]. But
then [a, b] is not ℵ0-categorical, despite being a dense subset of the ℵ0-categorical
structure Φ(S). This will give us our contradiction, assuming we can show Γ is
consistent.
We show this by compactness. So let Γ0 ⊂ Γ be finite. Then Γ0(a, b) says
at most that a < b, that [a, b] is not ℵ0-categorical, and that there is a formula
φ(x), contained in cofinitely many of the Φn, such that both a and b satisfy φ. So
pass to some sufficiently saturated S |= T , and let b ∈ S realize Φ. Let m be large
enough that realizing Φm guarantees realizing φ, and let a ∈ S realize a. For every
n < ω, there is a convex formula φn where Φi implies φn if and only if i = n. By
Lemma 3.1.1, there is a formula φ#n (x) where for all c ∈ [a, b], [a, b] |= φ#n (c) if and
only if S |= φn(c). But if m < n < n′ < ω, then φ#n and φ
#
n′ are disjoint definable
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subsets of [a, b], meaning [a, b] admits infinitely many inequivalent formulas, so is
not ℵ0-categorical. Thus (a, b) realize Γ0, completing the proof.
3.4 Examples
Here we give examples showing that all of our cases are possible. We include a basic
schema of examples for each case and leave generalizations to the reader.
Example 3.4.1. Let L = {<}, and let A = (Q, <). Then Th(A) is ℵ0-categorical
and I∞ω(Th(A)) = 1.
Proof. This is classical, but we summarize it. Suppose B ≡ A, so in particular,
B is dense without endpoints. It follows from these axioms (which turn out to be
complete) that if x1 < · · · < xn is an ascending sequence from either model, then
there is a tuple y from that mode satisfying y0 < x1 < y1 < x2 < · · · < xn < yn.
From here, showing B ≡∞ω A is immediate.
The following examples are due to Ehrenfeucht, and give examples of every
finite (non-one) value that I∞ω(T ) can take. By Corollary 3.3.14, the use of an
infinite language is necessary – no CLO in a finite language can fall into this class.
Example 3.4.2. Let n ≥ 1 be a natural number. Let L be the language {<}∪{Pk :
k ∈ ω} ∪ {Ui : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. Let A have underlying order (Q, <), where Pk(q) holds
if and only if k = q, and where the Ui partition the universe into dense and codense
pieces; for concreteness suppose that if Pk(q) holds, then U1(q) also holds.
Then T = Th(A) has exactly n+2 countable models, and I∞ω(Th(A)) = n+2.
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Proof. As this is also classical, we only summarize. For ease of notation, let ck refer
to the unique realization of Pk in whatever model we’re working with. The possible
options for a countable model, up to isomorphism, are as follows:
1. The sequence (ck) is unbounded above.
2. The sequence (ck) is bounded above, but has no least upper bound.
3. The sequence (ck) has a least upper bound, and this element satisfies Ui.
Since there are precisely n possible values of i in the last case, this is n + 2
distinct cases. Clearly being in a case is preserved under isomorphism, or even back-
and-forth equivalence, and all the cases are possible of models of T . So I∞ω(T ) =
n+ 2 and ∼=T is (n+ 2,=).
To move up to ∼=1, we can simply include infinitely many copies of this idea:
Example 3.4.3. Let S ⊂ Q be the set of all rationals of the form k + 1
n+1
where
k ∈ Z and n ∈ ω. Let L = {<} ∪ {Ps : s ∈ S}.
Let A have underlying order type (Q, <), and say Ps(q) holds if and only if
s = q. If T = Th(A), then ∼=T is ∼=1, and I∞ω(T ) = i1.
Proof. This is essentially infinitely many problems of the above form. In particular,
if M and N are models of T , then M ≡ N if and only if, for all k ∈ Z, the sequence
{k+ 1
n+1
: n ∈ ω} has a greatest lower bound, where we interpret these rationals as
the unique realizations of the associated predicates in each model.
This shows that ∼=T≤B∼=1 and I∞ω(T ) ≤ i1. The presence of a greatest lower
bound corresponds exactly to omitting a certain interval type (the one between
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k and the sequence (k + 1
n+1
)n), and the model A omits all of them. Thus, by
Lemma 3.3.8, one can omit or realize any set of these types, showing ∼=1≤B∼=T and
I∞ω(T ) ≥ i1.
The example of an ∼=2 example is probably the first thing you’d think of:
Example 3.4.4. Let L = {<} ∪ {Pq : q ∈ Q}, and let A have underlying order
type (Q, <). Say Pq(r) holds if and only if q = r. If T = Th(A), then ∼=T=∼=2, and
I∞ω(T ) = i2.
Proof. Clearly S1(T ) is uncountable, so ∼=2≤B T and I∞ω(T ) ≥ i2. It is enough to
show that T is locally simple. But observe that every Φ ∈ IT(T ) is defined exactly
by which rational numbers lie above or below (or in) Φ. Thus, if S is any sufficiently
saturated model and Φ ∈ IT(T ) is nonisolated, then the set Φ(S) has order type
which is dense and without endpoints, and all the predicates Ps will be false. So this
structure is ℵ0-categorical, so T is locally simple, so ∼=T≤B∼=2 and I∞ω(T ) ≤ i2, as
desired.
Local nonsimplicity can come about in a few ways. The first is simply to have
non-dense order type:
Example 3.4.5. Let L = {<} and let A = (Z, <). Then T = Th(A) is λ-Borel
complete for all λ, and I∞ω(T ) =∞.
Proof. This structure is self-additive by a classical argument, but A 6∼= A+ A, so is
not ℵ0-categorical. The result follows.
One can also hide a non-dense order type in a predicate:
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Example 3.4.6. Let L = {<} ∪ {P}, and let A = (Q, <,Z); that is, the predicate
P is said to hold only on the integers. Then T = Th(A) is λ-Borel complete for all
λ, and I∞ω(T ) =∞.
Proof. This structure is self-additive by appeal to the argument for (Z, <), but
again, A 6∼= A+ A.
Maximal complexity can also come about without any hidden non-density, but
just from too much behavior going on. The following example also gives an example
of a CLO which is maximally complex, but where every reduct to a finite language
is ℵ0-categorical; this behavior is impossible for o-minimal theories.
Example 3.4.7. Let L = {<}∪{Pn : n ∈ ω}. For each n, let Ln = {<}∪{Pk : k <
n}, so that Ln ⊂ L. Let Tn state that the order type is dense without endpoints,
and that the boolean combinations of {Pk : k < n} are all consistent and together
partition the space into dense, codense pieces.
Let T =
⋃
n Tn. Then each theory Tn is ℵ0-categorical, but T is locally nonsim-
ple (hence λ-Borel complete for all λ). All the theories Tn and T are self-additive.
Proof. ℵ0-categoricity and self-additivity of each Tn is immediate by a back-and-
forth argument. Clearly Tn+1 implies Tn, so Tn+1 ∪ Tn is consistent, and thus T is
consistent, although it is harder to construct a canonical model (indeed T has no
isolated types, and hence no prime model).
To see that T is self-additive, let A andB model T , and consider the embedding
A→ A+B (the other case is identical). If this embedding were not elementary, there
would be a formula witnessing it, and formulas use only finitely many elements of the
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language. Thus there is an n where the reducts An and Bn of A and B (respectively)
to Ln make An → An +Bn not elementary. But since T implies Tn, An and Bn are
models of Tn, contradicting self-additivity of Tn. So the original embedding must
have been elementary, establishing self-additivity.
To see that T is locally nonsimple, it is enough to observe that it is self-additive
and not ℵ0-categorical. We have demonstrated the former; for the latter, simply
observe that S1(T ) is infinite (indeed, uncountable), as {Pn(x) : n ∈ X}∪{¬Pn(x) :
n 6∈ X} is consistent for all X ⊂ ω.
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